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Before punishing an officer for professional misconduct, police 
departments often provide the officer with an opportunity to file an appeal. In 
many police departments, this appeals process culminates in a hearing before 
an arbitrator. While numerous media reports have suggested that arbitrators 
regularly overturn or reduce discipline, little legal research has 
comprehensively examined the outcomes of police disciplinary appeals across 
the United States. 
In order to better understand the use of arbitration in police 
disciplinary appeals and build on prior research, this Article draws on a 
dataset of 624 arbitration awards issued between 2006 and 2020 from a diverse 
range of law enforcement agencies. It finds that arbitrators on appeal reduced 
or overturned police officer discipline in 52% of these cases. In 46% of cases 
involving termination, arbitrators ordered police departments to rehire 
previously terminated officers. On average, arbitrators reduced the length of 
officer suspensions by approximately 49%.  
Arbitrators gave several common justifications for reductions in officer 
discipline. Frequently, arbitrators found the original discipline to be excessive 
relative to the offense committed or relative to punishments received by other 
officers. In a somewhat smaller number of cases, arbitrators cited insufficient 
evidence or procedural flaws in the investigation or adjudication of the original 
internal disciplinary process. 
This Article concludes by considering the implications of these findings 
for the literature on police accountability. It also considers emerging efforts in 
states like Minnesota and Oregon to reform police arbitration procedures in 
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INTRODUCTION 
In November 2016, Seattle Police Chief Kathleen O’Toole fired 
Officer Adley Shepherd for punching a handcuffed woman named 
Miyekko Durden-Bosley in the face, fracturing her orbital socket.1 The 
facts leading up to the assault were mostly not in dispute. Over two 
years earlier, Shepherd and two other Seattle Police Department 
(“SPD”) officers responded to a domestic violence call in a residential 
neighborhood in South Seattle.2 Video recordings of the incident showed 
Officer Shepherd became irritated as he and his fellow officers 
attempted to resolve a tense dispute between three individuals.3 
 
 1. Steve Miletich, Officer Fired for Punching Drunk, Handcuffed Woman, SEATTLE TIMES, 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/seattle-police-officer-fired-over-punching-of-
handcuffed-woman (last updated Nov. 9, 2016, 10:13 PM) [https://perma.cc/T3ZN-6M8V] 
(providing a link to a video of the incident and a full description of the events surrounding Officer 
Shepherd’s actions).  
 2. Steve Miletich, Video Shows SPD Officer Punch Cuffed Woman, Documents Say, SEATTLE 
TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/video-shows-spd-officer-punch-cuffed-woman-
documents-say (last updated Jan. 13, 2016, 11:22 AM) [https://perma.cc/6XS2-4EBR] (describing 
how Durden-Bosley appeared intoxicated in the video and repeatedly denied making any threats 
before her arrest).  
 3. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, OPA 14-0216, DISCIPLINARY ACTION REPORT: OFFICER ADLEY 
SHEPHERD (2016), http://spdblotter.seattle.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2016/11/DAR_ 
11.9.16.pdf [perma.cc/N5EB-W2F5] [hereinafter SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT] (providing the 
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Eventually, Officer Shepherd declared that his “patience was done” and 
that “someone was going to jail.”4 He then handcuffed Durden-Bosley 
and placed her under arrest for allegedly making threats.5 On the video, 
Durden-Bosley repeatedly shouted that she “did not make a threat.”6 
The video then shows Officer Shepherd force Durden-Bosley into the 
back of his squad car.7 Clearly upset, Durden-Bosley responded by 
kicking towards the officer, possibly striking Officer Shepherd in his 
jaw.8 Officer Shepherd briefly stepped back from the car to regain his 
balance and told his fellow officers, “she kicked me.”9 Seconds later, 
Officer Shepherd lunged into the backseat and punched Durden-Bosley 
in her right eye.10 Throughout the incident, Durden-Bosley’s hands 
were handcuffed behind her back.11   
While Officer Shepherd came away from the confrontation with 
relatively minimal injuries,12 Durden-Bosley suffered a bloody, bruised, 
and swollen right eye as a result of an orbital fracture.13 Almost 
immediately after the incident, the SPD’s Office of Professional 
Accountability opened an internal investigation into Officer Shepherd’s 
 
summary of factual findings made by the Officer of Police Accountability and signed by the Seattle 
police chief).  
 4. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 5. Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award at 11, Seattle Police Officers Guild v. 
City of Seattle, No. 2:12-cv-01282-JLR (Dec. 7, 2018), ECF No. 512-6.  
 6. Miletech, supra note 1 (linking video of incident).  
 7. Id. (showing a struggle between Officer Shepherd and Durden-Bosley that appears to 
result in Officer Shepherd shoving her into the squad car where she lands on her back with her 
legs hanging outside of the squad car, pointed in the direction of Officer Shepherd).  
 8. Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 4, 19. It is not 
immediately clear from the video whether the kicks hit the officer or where they may have made 
contact. Officer Shepherd also audibly exclaims that she kicked him before he punches her. Later 
in the evening, when Officer Shepherd reportedly sought medical attention, he claimed that 
Durden-Bosley’s Doc Marten shoe hit him in the jaw, causing him “shooting pain” for several 
seconds thereafter. See id. at 4, 6. In reviewing the events of that evening, the arbitrator on appeal 
described Durden-Bosley as engaging in a “felonious assault on an officer,” for which she was not 
charged. Id. at 6. 
 9. Id. at 4, 19.  
 10. Id.  
 11. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3 (placing particular emphasis on the fact 
that the suspect was handcuffed during his assault).  
 12. Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 6 (stating that Officer 
Shepherd was “diagnosed with moderate, acute Temporomandibular Disorder (TMD)” due to the 
trauma from the kick, but noting that he only took one sick day before returning to the force).  
 13. Lewis Kamb, Judge Reverses Arbitrator’s Rule Reinstating Seattle Police Officer Who 
Punched Handcuffed Suspect, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/judge-
reverses-arbitrators-rule-reinstating-seattle-police-officer-who-punched-handcuffed-suspect (last 
updated Aug. 17, 2019, 12:15 PM) [https://perma.cc/BMK2-HZKQ] (showing multiple graphic 
photographs of Durden-Bosley’s injuries from the confrontation and also describing how, in a very 
rare set of events, a judge ultimately overturned the decision of the arbitrator in this case based 
on a determination that it was contrary to public policy).  
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behavior.14 Durden-Bosley also filed a § 1983 suit alleging a deprivation 
of her civil rights,15 which Seattle settled for $195,000 in 2016.16 Two 
years later, after a lengthy internal investigation, Chief O’Toole 
concluded that Officer Shepherd violated the department’s use of force 
policy.17 As she explained in her disciplinary report, the department’s 
use of force policy requires officers to utilize de-escalation tactics and 
employ only necessary and proportional force.18 Officer Shepherd’s 
conduct violated these principles, as there was no justification for him 
to assault an unarmed, “small, handcuffed, and supine” woman whom 
he had already secured in the back of his squad car.19 And, according to 
Chief O’Toole, there were numerous ways that Officer Shepherd  
could have easily taken control of the situation without resorting to a  
violent assault.20  
Further, Chief O’Toole noted that this was not the first time that 
Officer Shepherd’s violation of departmental policies had seriously 
harmed a civilian. In 2009, the SPD suspended Officer Shepherd for ten 
days for prematurely releasing a domestic violence suspect who 
returned home and murdered his roommate.21 When viewed together, 
 
 14. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3 (describing the Office of Professional 
Accountability investigation of Officer Shepherd).  
 15. See Sara Jean Green, Woman Punched by SPD Cop While Handcuffed Files Lawsuit, 
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/woman-punched-by-spd-cop-
while-handcuffed-files-lawsuit/ (last updated Apr. 24, 2015, 9:11 AM) [https://perma.cc/4UVM-
AHN9] (explaining that the suit accused “the Seattle Police Department of negligent training and 
supervision of Shepherd and cites three violations of Durden-Bosley’s civil rights for excessive 
force, unreasonable search and seizure, and failure to train the officer,” and claimed further that 
Durden-Bosley experienced “severe pain, partial blindness, a concussion, nausea and vomiting” 
because of the assault). 
 16. Christine Clarridge, Woman Punched by Seattle Cop Settles Civil Suit for $195,000, 
SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/woman-punched-by-seattle-
officer-settles-suit-for-195000 (last updated June 21, 2016, 6:39 PM) [https://perma.cc/Q7UN-
M3QE] (discussing the controversy surrounding Officer Shepherd’s use of force against Durden-
Bosley and the subsequent settlement). 
 17. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3.  
 18. Id. (clarifying that under SPD policy, force may only be used against handcuffed suspects 
under “exceptional circumstances” like immediate risk of injury, escape, or destruction of property, 
none of which existed here).  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. (explaining that he could have stepped away to de-escalate, utilized the other two 
officers on the scene, attempted to simply close the door of the car, or simply paused momentarily 
to reassess the situation).  
 21. Id.: 
This instance marks . . . the second time you have failed to take personal 
responsibility . . . . You previously received a ten day suspension in 2009 for violating a 
different SPD policy where your failure resulted in the death of a victim; as such, you 
should be acutely aware of the potentially dire consequences of disregarding policies 
created to protect the public;  
Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 25–26 (describing the prior 
incident in detail).  
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Chief O’Toole concluded that this series of behaviors exhibited a pattern 
of poor judgment.22 Based on these findings, Chief O’Toole terminated 
Officer Shepherd’s employment with the SPD.23 But before Chief 
O’Toole could finalize the firing, Officer Shepherd had the legal right 
under his collective bargaining agreement to file an appeal before  
an arbitrator to determine whether “just cause” existed for  
his termination.24   
As is often the case in police disciplinary matters,25 Seattle’s 
police union contract empowers an arbitrator, as part of a panel, to lead 
an independent hearing to review factual and legal determinations 
made by the police chief.26 In November 2018—over four years after the 
incident in question—an arbitrator overturned the firing.27 While the 
arbitrator agreed that Officer Shepherd violated the department’s use 
of force policy in unjustifiably assaulting Durden-Bosley, she concluded 
that termination was simply “too severe a penalty.”28 Instead, the 
arbitrator reduced Officer Shepherd’s punishment to a fifteen-day 
suspension and ordered the SPD to rehire Shepherd with back pay.29   
 
 22. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3 (“I cannot take the risk of affording you 
further opportunity to serve as a police officer for this City given your demonstrated lapses in 
judgment and restraint.”). 
 23. Id. (“I have determined that your employment with the Department should  
be terminated.”).  
 24. CITY OF SEATTLE, AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF SEATTLE AND SEATTLE 
POLICE OFFICERS’ GUILD 7–8 (2013), https://www.seattle.gov/personnel/resources/pubs/SPOG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4PS7-BY3K]. It is worth noting that this was the then-effective collective 
bargaining agreement between Seattle and the Police Guild. They have since agreed to a different 
union contract that somewhat amends the appeals procedure in the city.  
 25. See Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 545 (2019) (providing 
a comprehensive empirical analysis of the disciplinary procedures in 656 police departments and 
finding that many of the features described in this introduction mirror those used by a majority of 
police departments in that sample).  
 26. CITY OF SEATTLE, supra note 24, at 7 (describing the “just cause” standard for  
disciplinary appeals).  
 27. In Seattle, police disciplinary appeals are handled by a Disciplinary Review Board 
consisting of one representative appointed by the police union, one representative appointed by 
the city (often a high-ranking supervisor like the assistant chief), and one labor arbitrator selected 
“from a pool of arbitrators agreed upon by the parties within 30 days after execution of the 
agreement.” Id. at 8. Functionally, this means that when a grievance is filed by the police union 
on behalf of an officer, arguing that the city has punished an officer without just cause, the decision 
of the appointed labor arbitrator will likely bind the city. For all practical purposes, this model of 
litigating police disciplinary appeals is similar to those used by many American cities, in that the 
labor arbitrator has the final say in these disciplinary grievances. Disciplinary Review Board’s 
Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 31 (“Although his was a serious offense, the Board majority 
finds that discharge was too severe a penalty, considering the circumstances of his use of force and 
other mitigating considerations.”).  
 28. Disciplinary Review Board’s Opinion and Award, supra note 5, at 31.  
 29. Id.: 
The Board majority hereby orders instead that Officer Shepherd be disciplined for 
violating City’s policy on the use of force with a 15-day unpaid suspension. It is also 
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Police reform advocates and city leaders in Seattle were 
disappointed and frustrated by the arbitrator’s decision.30 Although 
some might find the events in Seattle troubling, they do not appear 
unique. All across the country, reporters have documented numerous 
similar cases where arbitrators on appeal have ordered police 
departments to rehire officers deemed unfit for duty by their 
supervisors.31 These include: an officer in Sarasota, Florida, caught on 
camera allegedly beating a suspect in custody without justification;32 an 
officer in San Antonio, Texas, who repeatedly used an offensive racial 
slur while arresting a Black man;33 a Broward County, Florida, sheriff’s 
deputy who allegedly hid during the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High 
School shooting;34 and a Washington, D.C., officer who allegedly 
sexually abused a teenager in his squad car.35 
Officers argue that these appellate hearings provide an 
important due process protection by allowing a neutral third party to 
reevaluate internal disciplinary actions.36 According to this viewpoint, 
 
ordered that he be reinstated as a police officer and that he receive[ ] full back 
pay . . . less 15 days for the suspension, and less all interim earnings and compensation. 
 30. Lewis Kamb, Arbitrator Reinstates Seattle Police Officer Fired in 2016 for Punching 
Intoxicated Handcuffed Woman, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/arbitrator-reinstates-seattle-police-officer-fired-in-2016-for-punching-intoxicated-
handcuffed-woman/ (last updated Nov. 20, 2018, 3:30 PM) [https://perma.cc/R6P9-4LET] (quoting 
the spokesman for the city attorney saying that they were “disappointed” and “strongly disagree 
with” the decision; also noting that the NAACP in Seattle wanted Officer Shepherd criminally 
prosecuted for his behavior and likened “the case to the deaths of two black men, Eric Garner in 
New York and Michael Brown in Missouri”).  
 31. For a comprehensive series of stories about officers rehired on appeal, see Kimbriell Kelly, 
Wesley Lowery & Steven Rich, Fired/Rehired: Police Chiefs Are Often Forced to Put Officers Fired 
for Misconduct Back on the Streets, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/2017/investigations/police-fired-rehired/ [https://perma.cc/VJZ8-JH3Z]. For other 
examples not listed below, see Everton Bailey Jr., Portland Must Rehire Cop Fired After Killing 
Unarmed Man in 2010, Court Rules, OREGONIAN, https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/ 
index.ssf/2015/12/portland_must_rehire_cop_fired.html (last updated Jan. 9, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/MH46-6DD4] (explaining that an appellate court upheld an arbitrator’s 
decision); Connecticut Town Rehires Officer Who Shot Unarmed Man, NEW HAVEN REG., 
https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Connecticut-town-rehires-officer-who-shot-
unarmed-11367888.php (last updated July 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/GST3-2ZHB]. 
 32. Conor Friedersdorf, How Police Unions and Arbitrators Keep Abusive Cops on the Street, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/how-police-unions-
keep-abusive-cops-on-the-street/383258/ [https://perma.cc/WD8W-YE4T]. 
 33. Mary Claire Patton & Tim Gerber, San Antonio Officer Fired for Using N-Word Gets Job 
Back, KSAT NEWS, https://www.ksat.com/news/2019/11/05/san-antonio-officer-fired-for-using-n-
word-gets-job-back/ (last updated Jan. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/UYT4-JETC]. 
 34. Devoun Cetoute & Carli Teproff, Fired Parkland BSO Deputy Given Job Back With Full 
Back Pay, Union Says, MIAMI HERALD (May 13, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/ 
local/community/broward/article242719216.html [https://perma.cc/LJZ6-RLX4]. 
 35. Kelly et al., supra note 31.  
 36. Id. (explaining that “[p]olice unions argue that the right to appeal terminations through 
arbitration protects officers from arbitrary punishment or being second-guessed for their split-
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these types of appellate procedures protect officers from unfair 
punishment and force police departments to maintain high standards 
in the investigation and adjudication of alleged misconduct. But some 
police reform advocates and police chiefs criticize the use of arbitration 
in appeals of police discipline as an antidemocratic usurpation of a 
community’s ability to control its police force.37 Critics also argue that 
the procedural choices made by some police departments in employing 
these appeals may systematically incentivize unreasonably high rates 
of reversals or reductions in discipline on appeal.38 If true, this critique 
of police arbitration has significant implications for the literature on 
police accountability. A relatively small body of legal research, however, 
has considered the outcomes of appellate arbitrations in police 
disciplinary cases.  
This Article contributes to the existing literature and builds on 
prior research39 by conducting an examination of police arbitration 
across a national dataset of 624 police disciplinary appeals litigated 
before over two hundred arbitrators between 2006 and 2020 from a 
diverse range of law enforcement agencies.40 This dataset covers police 
appellate arbitration decisions in twenty-eight states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico.41 It includes disciplinary appeals for police 
departments and sheriff’s departments of all sizes, as well as a number 
of specialized law enforcement agencies.42 Of these 624 opinions, 333 
involved appeals of officer terminations.43 In another 257 of the cases, 
officers appealed suspensions.44 And in thirty-four cases, officers 
 
second decisions” and further quoting union officials believing that “police chiefs are prone  
to overreach”).  
 37. Id. (quoting the San Antonio police chief as saying that “[t]o overturn a police chief’s 
decision . . . is a disservice to the good order of the department” and that it “undermines a chief’s 
authority and ignores the chief’s understanding of what serves the best interest of the community 
and department”).  
 38. Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Chicago: Arbitration or Arbitrary, 89 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 215, 235, 240 (1998) (explaining that the “selection of who will serve as an arbitrator 
depends upon the willingness of both parties to a dispute . . . to accept that individual as an 
arbitrator” and how the selection method may result in arbitrators frequently choosing to “split 
the baby”).  
 39. See infra Part II.  
 40. See infra Part III (describing the methodology and dataset in more detail).  
 41. Infra Part III. 
 42. Infra Part III (explaining the demographic profile of law enforcement agencies in the 
sample used in this Article and describing in more detail how this sample was sorted to focus on 
patrol officers and other equivalent law enforcement professionals, omitting any cases involving 
corrections officers, police dispatchers, forensics professionals, or crime scene investigators).  
 43. Infra Part III (representing 52.4% of the sample). 
 44. Infra Part III (representing 41.2% of the sample). 
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appealed other types of disciplinary actions like letters of written 
reprimand, demotions, or losses of job responsibilities.45  
Arbitrators on appeal reduced or overturned police discipline in 
around 52% of cases.46 In about 46% of termination cases, arbitrators 
ordered police departments to rehire previously terminated officers.47 
On average, arbitrators reduced the length of disciplinary suspensions 
by approximately 49%.48 Arbitrators gave several common justifications 
for reductions in officer discipline. In a significant percentage of these 
cases, arbitrators found the original discipline to be excessive relative 
to the offense committed or relative to the punishments given to other 
officers from that same department in the past.49 In a somewhat smaller 
number of cases, arbitrators cited insufficient evidence or procedural 
flaws in the investigation or adjudication of the original internal 
disciplinary process.50  
These findings are consistent with prior examinations of 
arbitration outcomes of police disciplinary appeals.51 Further, these 
findings make several contributions to the literature on police 
accountability. First, these findings are potentially consistent with 
prior scholarly characterizations of management decisionmaking in 
internal police disciplinary systems as “uneven, arbitrary,” and, at 
times, “entirely discretionary.”52 Under this view, the high rate of 
disciplinary reductions or reversals by arbitrators on appeal may 
suggest that many departments are failing to conduct sufficiently 
robust investigations. Arbitration may be merely providing necessary 
relief to officers aggrieved by a faulty disciplinary system. Additionally, 
the relatively high rate of reductions or reversals in discipline may also 
be a predictable outgrowth of the type of cases that proceed to 
arbitration. Evidence from prior studies suggest that a substantial 
number of appealed disciplinary sentences result in an eventual 
 
 45. Infra Part III (representing 5.4% of the sample). 
 46. See infra Section IV.B (finding that 327 out of 624 punishments were reduced or 
overturned by arbitrators).  
 47. See infra Section IV.C (discussing arbitrators’ justifications for reversals and revisions of 
disciplinary actions). 
 48. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the rates of arbitrators’ reversals and revisions of 
disciplinary actions).  
 49. See infra Section IV.D (using this data to further argue that arbitration does less to 
correct procedural due process concerns than to substitute the judgment of democratically elected 
officials with the judgment of arbitrators).  
 50. Infra Section IV.D. 
 51. See infra Part IV (describing the consistency of these findings with prior academic and 
media examinations of this topic).  
 52. Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839, 842 (2019). 
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settlement with management.53 Once more, the cases that proceed to 
arbitration may not be a random sample of all disciplinary cases, but 
rather those cases where both management and the police union believe 
they have a reasonable likelihood of success before an arbitrator. If this 
is the case, then perhaps it should not be surprising that arbitration 
results in each side succeeding roughly half of the time. Thus, 
supporters of arbitration in police disciplinary cases may argue that the 
data revealed by this study are consistent with the system working  
as intended.  
Second, and alternatively, critics of police arbitration may point 
to these findings as consistent with prior critiques of the use of 
arbitration on appeal in police disciplinary cases. Prior studies have 
hypothesized that, as repeat players,54 arbitrators may be incentivized 
to compromise in order to increase their chances of being selected for 
future cases.55 Cities commonly employ alternative strike methods to 
select arbitrators in police disciplinary appeals.56 Under this selection 
strategy, the union or the aggrieved officer and the police department 
are initially presented with a panel of arbitrators (typically seven or 
another single digit odd number).57 Each side then alternatively strikes 
 
 53. See, e.g., William Bender & David Gambacorta, Fired, Then Rehired, PHILA. INQUIRER 
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.inquirer.com/news/a/philadelphia-police-problem-union-misconduct-
secret-20190912.html [https://perma.cc/F23N-A87M] (noting that a substantial number of the 170 
cases reviewed by the Inquirer resulted in settlements before arbitration).  
 54. In the dataset for this Article, many of the arbitrators appear many times. For example, 
one arbitrator in Texas (Harold E. Moore) appears nineteen times in the dataset. Another 
arbitrator (Walt De Treux) appears twenty-one times, primarily in Pennsylvania.  
 55. See Iris, supra note 38, at 235, 240; see also Mark Iris, Police Discipline in Houston: The 
Arbitration Experience, 5 POLICE Q. 132 (2002) (documenting how arbitrators in Houston appear 
to be motivated to “split the baby” in order to be selected in future cases); Rushin, supra note 25, 
at 576 (“The potential problem with using such a procedure [of arbitrator selection] in internal 
disciplinary appeals is that it may incentivize arbitrators to consistently compromise on 
punishment to increase their probability of being selected in future cases.”).  
 56. Rushin, supra note 25, at 574–75 (finding that in a sample of 656 police departments, 
54% of the municipalities not only employed arbitration on appeal but also used this kind of 
selection method).  
 57. See, e.g., Agreement Between City of Milwaukee and the Milwaukee Police Association, 
Local #21, I.U.P.A., AFL-CIO 12 (2012), https://city.milwaukee.gov/ImageLibrary/User/jkamme/ 
LaborContracts/Local_21_MPA_2010-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM4D-C8NM] (establishing such 
an alternate strike approach); Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Oakland and 
Oakland Police Officers’ Association 20 (2015), https://cao-94612.s3.amazonaws.com/ 
documents/oak057845.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5KY-F7E4] (also using an alternate strike 
approach); Agreement Between the City of Akron and Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #7, at 8 
(Nov. 15, 2016), https://serb.ohio.gov/static/PDF/Contracts/2015/15-MED-10-1144.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XU4F-NZ5M] (also using an alternate strike approach); Labor Agreement 
Between the City of Minneapolis and the Police Officers’ Federation of Minneapolis, at attach. H 
(2017), http://www2.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@hr/documents/webcontent/wcmsp-
200131.pdf [https://perma.cc/HY8Y-9YP2] (establishing alternate striking methodology as well).  
          
1032 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4:1023 
names from the panel until one arbitrator remains.58 Prior scholars 
have argued that this method of selecting arbitrators creates incentives 
for arbitrators to meet in the middle in as many cases as possible so as 
to increase their chances of winning out in this alternative strike 
selection method in future cases.59 And scholars worry that this 
incentive towards compromise may systematically lead to large 
numbers of officers fired for misconduct having their terminations 
downgraded to mere suspensions.60 The findings of this Article are 
potentially consistent with this critique, although they fall short of 
validating such a hypothesis. In the dataset examined in this Article, 
arbitration hearings resulted in approximately half of all cases being 
overturned or substantially reduced. And it resulted in a typical officer 
serving roughly half of their original disciplinary suspension.  
Third, and relatedly, this Article’s findings help inform the 
broader normative debate about the appropriate scope of appellate 
review in police disciplinary cases. Police unions may understandably 
argue that police arbitration results in large numbers of reversals or 
reductions in discipline because police departments regularly conduct 
inadequate investigations or fail to provide officers with adequate 
procedural rights in their so-called Loudermill hearings—that is, the 
disciplinary hearings that police departments must ordinarily provide 
officers before issuing some types of punishment, like termination.61 
While arbitrators in many cases in the present dataset did identify 
procedural flaws in a department’s internal disciplinary process, this 
Article finds that such procedural justifications for reversals or 
reductions were somewhat less common than other justifications for 
 
 58. See, e.g., Agreement Between Illinois FOP Labor Council and City of Champaign Patrol 
and Sergeant 66 (2015), http://documents.ci.champaign.il.us/v/0B8wlv3QqeZtnT0h6elh0RVE2W
TQ [https://perma.cc/S5AA-SK4T] (establishing this kind of methodology); Collective Bargaining 
Agreement Between City of Boulder and Boulder Police Officers Association 13 (2016), 
https://www.lris.com/wp-content/uploads/contracts/boulder_co_police.pdf [https://perma.cc/87J2-
AJT8] (allowing for such a methodology); see also Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Las 
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department & Las Vegas Police Protective Association 19 (2016), 
https://lvppa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CBA-2016-2019-signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
G7NL-HQSL] (establishing a procedure that allows the union to select two of five potential 
arbitrators, with two of the additional arbitrators selected by the city and one selected by mutual 
agreement between the parties). 
 59. See, e.g., Eric Litke, Unions Limit Police Accountability, but Moore Claim Exaggerates 
Impact, POLITIFACT (July 10, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/jul/10/gwen-
moore/unions-limit-police-accountability-discipline [https://perma.cc/RT2Q-CTW5] (quoting 
Professor Samuel Walker for the proposition that “the arbitration process consistently tends to 
find a middle ground,” that is, “a reduction of department-ordered discipline”).  
 60. See generally Iris, supra note 38 (worrying about this very phenomenon).  
 61. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that before a public 
servant can be deprived of their property right in their employment, the employer must provide a 
pretermination hearing including a notice of the charges, an explanation of the evidence, and an 
opportunity to respond to the charges).   
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reductions or reversal. Arbitrators primarily cited procedural due 
process concerns in a minority of all cases where they ultimately 
overturned or reduced discipline.62 Instead, this Article finds that 
reversals and reductions in police officer punishments are more 
commonly the result of arbitrators concluding that the punishment is 
excessive relative to the officer’s offense,63 the punishment fails to 
consider mitigating circumstances in an officer’s service record,64 or 
that the punishment is disparate relative to what other officers in that 
agency have received in the past.65 In a smaller, but still significant, 
number of cases, arbitrators simply disagreed with the factual 
determinations reached by police supervisors or city officials.66 Put 
simply, in many cases, arbitrators overturned decisions by police chiefs 
and city officials because of disagreements over facts or concerns about 
proportionality, not because of procedural due process concerns. This 
raises challenging normative and policy questions about the proper role 
of arbitrators in overturning decisions made by more democratically 
accountable actors. It further illustrates the real-world consequences of 
the expansive standard of review given to arbitrators in police 
disciplinary appeals cases.  
Based on these observations, this Article considers how 
communities could rethink the use of arbitration on appeal in police 
disciplinary cases. In doing so, it considers approaches recently adopted 
by Minnesota and Oregon in reforming their respective uses of police 
 
 62. This represented only 42 of the 327 cases where an arbitrator overturned or reduced 
discipline on appeal. This number indicates the circumstances where an arbitrator overruled a 
matter exclusively or primarily due to procedural due process issues. In a higher number of cases, 
arbitrators listed procedural due process concerns as one of multiple issues (and often as an issue 
of secondary concern).  
 63. See, e.g., Decision of Arbitrator, Employer and Command Officers Association, 148269-
AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148269 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 25, 2013) (Wolkinson, Arb.) (redacted 
decision) (reinstating an officer after prior termination because of a belief that the penalty was 
excessive relative to the offense).   
 64. See, e.g., Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. v. Steele Cnty., Case No. 06-PA-0620, at 8–9 (Minn. 
Bureau of Mediation Servs. Oct. 26, 2006) (Befort, Arb.) (reducing a written reprimand to an oral 
reprimand based in part on mitigating factors in the officer’s service record); Fairfield Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Off. v. FOP, FMCS Case No. 07/01667, 124 BNA LA (BL) 1066, 1073 (Fed. Mediation & 
Conciliation Serv. Nov. 5, 2007) (Chattman, Arb.) (“[T]he Arbitrator finds that although the 
Grievant committed an act worthy of discipline, the penalty of discharge was too excessive  
given the Grievant’s long term employment, commendations, previous work in positions  
of responsibility . . . .”).  
 65. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Youngstown Police Ass’n, 134 BNA LA (BL) 1644, 1653–
54 (May 20, 2015) (Bell, Arb.) (reducing a fifteen-day suspension to a half-day suspension because 
of concerns related to disparate treatment). 
 66. See, e.g., City of Junction City v. Junction City Police Officers’ Ass’n, FOP Lodge 43,  
FMCS Case No. 181017/00551, 139 BNA LA (BL) 617, 624 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv 
July 13, 2018) (Costello, Arb.) (disagreeing with the department’s factual judgment, overturning 
an officer’s termination, and ordering reinstatement with back pay). 
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arbitration. In Minnesota, state legislators passed a statute amending 
the selection process for arbitrators in police disciplinary appeals.67 
Under the new state law, rather than having arbitrators selected via an 
alternative strike process, the state assigns arbitrators from a rotating 
panel appointed by the state.68 Legislators hoped that this fix would 
prevent both police unions and management from gaming the selection 
process. Oregon has taken a different approach to reforming police 
arbitration by limiting the authority of arbitrators.69 The new Oregon 
law requires all communities to develop disciplinary matrices that 
establish specified ranges of punishment for different types of 
misconduct.70 Then, when arbitrators hear disciplinary appeals, their 
review authority is limited by the applicable disciplinary matrix.71 As 
long as the arbitrator finds there to be sufficient evidence to prove an 
officer engaged in the alleged misconduct and the punishment is 
consistent with the community’s disciplinary matrix, the arbitrator 
may not alter the punishment issued by management. This reform 
effectively acts as a limitation on the scope of arbitration, while 
simultaneously requiring departments to provide officers with 
adequate notice of the disciplinary consequences of wrongdoing. This 
Article argues that each state’s new law may represent a substantial 
 
 67. This change came as part of a broader reform measure, the Minnesota Police 
Accountability Act of 2020. See Walker Orenstein & Peter Callaghan, The Legislature Just Passed 
a Police Reform Bill. What It Does – and Doesn’t Do – to Reshape Law Enforcement in Minnesota, 
MINNPOST (July 21, 2020), https://www.minnpost.com/state-government/2020/07/the-legislature-
just-passed-a-police-reform-bill-what-it-does-and-doesnt-do-to-reshape-law-enforcement-in-
minnesota [https://perma.cc/75RD-69Q9] (providing a summary of this overall legislative 
package); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.892 (West 2020) (describing the new selection method, whereby 
the commissioner of the Bureau of Mediation Services appoints a slate of possible arbitrators).  
 68. § 626.892(11) (“The parties shall not participate in, negotiate for, or agree to the selection 
of an arbitrator or arbitration panel under this section.”). 
 69. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.706 (West 2020) (requiring, in certain situations, that 
“arbitration award[s] must conform to [various listed] principles”); see also Dirk VanderHart, 
Oregon Legislative Session on Police Accountability Coming Soon, OR. PUB. BROAD. (June 11, 2020, 
5:08 PM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/police-accountability-arbitration-oregon-special-
session-legislature [https://perma.cc/A6QS-PB6Q] (describing the legislative debate leading to the 
passage of this change in Oregon law and detailing how it was designed to limit the ability of 
arbitrators to overturn discipline when they agreed with the factual findings of the department); 
Steve Benham, Police Reform Plan Restricts Arbitrator from Overturning Discipline Decisions, 
KATU (June 22, 2020), https://katu.com/news/politics/police-reform-plan-restricts-arbitrator-
from-overturning-discipline-decisions [https://perma.cc/F7SY-WFSG] (similarly describing  
the legislation).  
 70. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.650(7)(g) (describing the requirement of departments and 
unions to develop disciplinary matrices during collective bargaining negotiations).  
 71. Id. § 243.706(3) (noting that if an “arbitrator makes a finding that misconduct has 
occurred consistent with the law enforcement agency’s finding of misconduct,” then “the 
arbitration award may not order any disciplinary action that differs from . . . the provisions of a 
discipline guide or discipline matrix adopted by the agency”). 
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step towards better balancing officers’ interests in due process with the 
public’s important interest in accountability.   
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the internal 
disciplinary process in American police departments and describes the 
use of arbitration to adjudicate disciplinary appeals. Part II situates 
this project within the existing literature on police disciplinary appeals 
and police accountability more generally. Part III walks through this 
study’s dataset and methodology. Part IV presents the results of this 
empirical examination, and Part V considers some of the implications 
of this study’s findings for the literature on police accountability.  
I. INTERNAL POLICE DISCIPLINE AND THE ROLE OF APPEALS 
In order to reform police agencies, supervisors must pursue 
“rigorous enforcement of departmental regulations” and punish officers 
engaged in wrongdoing.72 This punishment comes in the form of written 
reprimands, demotions, suspensions, and, in some cases, terminations 
of officers’ employment. Aggressive enforcement of internal rules both 
“deters future misconduct and removes unfit officers from the streets.”73 
But numerous police chiefs have argued that, because of labor and 
employment protections afforded to police officers during internal 
investigations and disciplinary proceedings, supervisors cannot 
meaningfully oversee or control their departments.74 And even if  
a police supervisor does punish an officer for professional misconduct, 
officers commonly receive reductions or reversals of discipline  
on appeal.  
This Part discusses the internal disciplinary process in 
American police departments. It starts by discussing how labor and 
employment provisions purportedly designed to protect officers’ due 
process rights during internal investigations may impede 
accountability efforts. Then, it focuses specifically on widespread use of 
arbitration in police disciplinary appeals.  
A. Internal Investigations of Police Misconduct 
Existing legal scholarship on police reform focuses largely on 
external accountability mechanisms. For example, scholars have 
theorized on the potential benefits and limitations of the exclusionary 
 
 72. Rushin, supra note 25, at 549.  
 73. Id.  
 74. See, e.g., Kelly et al., supra note 31 (noting one police chief’s objection that overturning a 
department’s decision to discharge an officer “undermines a chief’s authority and ignores the 
chief’s understanding of what serves the best interest of the community and the department”). 
          
1036 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4:1023 
rule,75 civil rights litigation via § 1983,76 criminal prosecution,77 and 
federal consent decrees78 in altering police behavior. But scholars have 
spent comparatively less time considering the role of the internal 
disciplinary process in promoting officer accountability and 
constitutional policing. The internal disciplinary process determines 
which officers will face employment penalties in cases of misconduct. 
And the internal disciplinary process covers all types of wrongdoing, 
including misconduct that may not rise to the level of warranting 
evidentiary exclusion, criminal prosecution, or a civil lawsuit.79  
 
 75. The exclusionary rule prevents prosecutors from introducing at trial evidence obtained in 
violation of the Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (expanding the exclusionary 
rule to apply to state and local law enforcement misconduct). The Court crafted this rule in part 
to deter police misconduct “by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Scholars have questioned the ability of this change to bring about widespread 
reform in police departments. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS 
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 322–23 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that the exclusionary rule may be 
ineffective at bringing about significant change). 
 76. Victims of police misconduct may file a civil suit against the officer that violated their 
constitutional rights and, in some cases, the agency that employed that officer. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
But succeeding in a § 1983 suit requires litigants to overcome the qualified immunity barrier, 
which exempts police officers from civil suit under § 1983 unless their wrongdoing violated “clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see 
also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–41 (2002) (defining “clearly established” for § 1983 
purposes); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614–18 (1999) (further clarifying the definition of 
“clearly established”). For a thorough critique of the qualified immunity doctrine, see Joanna C. 
Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1797 (2018). Individuals 
can only reach the employing municipality in § 1983 cases where they are able to prove that the 
officer’s conduct was the result of deliberate indifference in their failure to train or oversee their 
employees. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (establishing deliberate indifference 
for failure to train as the standard for municipal liability under § 1983); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700–01 (1978) (permitting municipal liability claims for some § 1983 cases). 
Scholars have also critiqued § 1983 litigation by arguing that communities often do not properly 
internalize the costs of these lawsuits. E.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, 
Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1148 (2016). Research has also shown that 
governments commonly indemnify officers, meaning that individual officers do not feel the 
financial burdens of misconduct. Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
885, 890 (2014) (illustrating the prevelance of indemnification policies across the country). 
 77. Perhaps the best database on criminal charges brought against police officers comes from 
Bowling Green State University, which finds relatively few cases of criminal charges associated 
with officer use of force historically. THE HENRY A. WALLACE POLICE CRIME DATABASE, 
https://policecrime.bgsu.edu (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) [https://perma.cc/977K-RFP]; see also 
Kimberly Kindy & Kimbriell Kelly, Thousands Dead, Few Prosecuted, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/04/11/thousands-dead-few-prosecuted 
[https://perma.cc/4ZMZ-AMZA] (noting the scarcity of charges against police officers, despite 
thousands of deaths at their hands since 2005). 
 78. For a detailed summary of the benefits and drawbacks of federal consent decrees, see 
Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99 MINN. L.  
REV. 1343, 1396–1418 (2015) (describing the Department of Justice’s use of consent decrees  
and empirically assessing their effectiveness in promoting reform, as well as other  
potential drawbacks).  
 79. For a more complete breakdown of the kinds of misconduct that ends up in this internal 
disciplinary system, see infra Section IV.A.  
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In many jurisdictions, this internal investigation is conducted by 
an internal affairs division within a law enforcement agency.80 In order 
to hold an officer accountable through the internal disciplinary process, 
police supervisors or internal investigators must first identify and 
investigate potential misconduct. In conducting these types of internal 
investigations of police officer misconduct, investigators must navigate 
“a complex web of labor and employment laws” that limits the kinds of 
investigation techniques they may employ and the kind of evidence they 
may use to build their case.81 These regulations are designed to protect 
officers from management abuse and ensure adequate due process 
rights during internal investigations. These limitations are derived 
from several sources, including police union contracts, civil service 
statutes, and law enforcement officer bills of rights (“LEOBRs”).  
Roughly two-thirds of American police officers are part of labor 
unions that bargain collectively with their employers over wages, 
benefits, and other conditions of employment.82 In many jurisdictions, 
this statutory language empowers police unions to negotiate internal 
disciplinary procedures.83 In addition, numerous states and localities 
have passed civil service laws or other local ordinances that further 
restrict the ability of police supervisors to investigate and discipline 
officers suspected of misconduct.84 And in another roughly twenty 
states, the state legislature has passed a LEOBR designed to protect 
officers’ due process rights during internal investigations.85 Together, 
union contracts and LEOBRs establish limitations on the ability of 
supervisors to investigate officer misconduct,86 including delays of 
 
 80. See Udi Ofer, Getting It Right: Building Effective Civilian Review Boards to Oversee 
Police, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1033, 1039–43, 1047–48, 1052 (2016) (providing a detailed 
assessment of civilian review board models in the nation’s fifty largest cities; finding that a 
minority of twenty-four have civilian review boards; also finding that these boards rarely have 
extensive authority, instead vesting authority with internal investigators and police supervisors).  
 81. Rushin, supra note 25, at 557.  
 82. See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 (rev. 
ed. 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd07.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZDQ6-CREN] (showing the 
percentage of officers that are part of unions); Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police 
Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 740–44 (2017) (describing the statutory provisions that permit 
police officers to collectively bargain and how these statutes have been interpreted).  
 83. Fisk & Richardson, supra note 82, at 740–41.  
 84. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 797 (2012) (describing 
the challenges potentially posed by civil service laws as they apply to law enforcement). 
 85. Aziz Z. Huq & Richard McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to Challenge 
the Police Privilege to Delay Investigations, 2016 CHI. LEGAL F. 213, 222. 
 86. For a complete, careful, and regularly updated explanation of the ways that union 
contracts and LEOBRs may impede accountability, see CAMPAIGN ZERO, CHECK THE POLICE, 
http://www.checkthepolice.org [https://perma.cc/BKH5-RB37]. 
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officer interrogations after suspected misconduct,87 requirements that 
supervisors give officers access to incriminating evidence before 
interrogations,88 bans on the investigation of anonymous complaints,89 
and requirements that supervisors purge officer disciplinary records 
that could be used to evaluate patterns of officer misconduct over time.90 
Prior research has suggested that the existence of these extensive 
limitations on internal investigations may contribute to higher rates of 
officer misconduct. For example, one study by Professors Dhammika 
Dharmapala, Richard McAdams, and John Rappaport found that the 
introduction of collective bargaining to Florida Sheriff’s Departments 
was associated with a statistically significant increase in complaints 
and officer violence against civilians.91 But a recent study by Professor 
Felipe Goncalves failed to find statistically significant increases in 
 
 87. See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal 
Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, at 4 (2012), https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/ 
dol/Collective%20Bargaining%20Agreement3/FOPCBA2012-2017_2.20.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
8G7N-GDUN] (establishing rigid delay periods before some interrogations); Meet & Confer 
Agreement Between the Houston Police Officers’ Union and the City of Houston, Texas 39–41 
(2015), https://hpou.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-2018-MC-Draft-Prior-to-Ratification.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UDA8-3RDH] (providing a general forty-eight hour waiting period); Agreement 
Between the City of Norman, Oklahoma and the Fraternal Order of Police – Lodge No. 122, at 6 
(2016), https://www.normanok.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2020-06/FOP%20Contract% 
20FYE%2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RWL-T62E] (providing a ten working-day delay to secure 
representation before being interviewed).  
 88. See, e.g., Agreement Between City of Green Bay and Green Bay Professional Police 
Association 49 (2016), https://greenbaywi.gov/DocumentCenter/View/306/Police-Officers-
Agreement-PDF [https://perma.cc/KNU5-N78U] (providing officers with access to description and 
summary of all physical evidence against them prior to interview); Memorandum of 
Understanding: The City of Phoenix and Phoenix Law Enforcement Association 12 (2016), 
https://azplea.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/MOU-2016-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5428-
GV6X] (providing officers with “any material that is being used as the basis for an allegation of 
misconduct” including “video, audio, photographs, or documents”).  
 89. See, e.g., Agreement Between the City of Chicago Department of Police and the Fraternal 
Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7, supra note 87, at 4 (“No anonymous complaints made against 
an Officer shall be made the subject of a Complaint Register investigation unless the allegation is 
a violation of the Illinois Criminal Code, the criminal code of another state of the United States or 
a criminal violation of a federal statute.”).   
 90. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Cleveland and Cleveland Police 
Patrolmen’s Association Non-Civilian Personnel 7 (2013), https://serb.ohio.gov/ 
static/PDF/Contracts/2010/10-CON-05-0536.pdf [https://perma.cc/UGA3-EBGC] (requiring 
removal of disciplinary action from personnel file after two years and verbal or written reprimands 
after six months).  
 91. Dhammika Dharmapala, Richard H. McAdams & John Rappaport, Collective Bargaining 
Rights and Police Misconduct: Evidence from Florida (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & 
Econ. Rsch., Paper No. 831, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3095217 
[https://perma.cc/LW4J-XJE6]; see also Abdul N. Rad, Police Institutions and Police Abuse: 
Evidence from the U.S. (Apr. 23, 2018) (M.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3246419 [https://perma.cc/4BCF-CTQD].  
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officer misconduct in Florida law enforcement agencies after the 
introduction of unionization.92  
If a supervisor or internal affairs division within a police 
department is able to uncover evidence of wrongdoing by an officer, 
officers are often guaranteed a predisciplinary hearing. This right to a 
predisciplinary hearing comes from Cleveland Board of Education v. 
Loudermill, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that many public 
sector employees, like police officers, have a property right in their 
continued employment.93 Thus, deprivation of this property right by the 
government triggers certain due process requirements, including a 
written notice of charges, explanation of evidence against them, and an 
opportunity to be heard.94 This Loudermill hearing serves as an 
important check, particularly pretermination, to ensure that 
reasonable grounds exist for the proposed discipline.95 So, take the 
example involving Seattle Officer Shepherd’s use of force against the 
handcuffed woman from the Introduction. In that case, before Chief 
O’Toole could terminate Officer Shepherd’s employment, the city 
provided him with an explanation of the alleged policy violations and 
the evidence supporting the city’s position.96  
During the Loudermill hearing, Officer Shepherd had an 
opportunity to defend himself and respond to the charges. He argued 
that his actions were appropriate under the circumstances. He 
emphasized his prior contacts with Durden-Bosley and her history with 
law enforcement.97 He provided his own competing experts, who argued 
that his use of force was justified under the circumstances.98 He asked 
the city to consider the totality of his service record and training 
 
92.  Felipe Goncalves, Do Police Unions Increase Misconduct? 20–21 (Mar. 2021) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58d9a8d71e5b6c72dc2a90f1/t/60622724b6a90
2732b636324/1617045285669/Goncalves_Unions.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZV7-C2NL]. 
 93. 470 U.S. 532, 539 (1985) (“The statute plainly supports the conclusion, reached by both 
lower courts, that respondents possessed property rights in continued employment.”).  
 94. Id. at 546: 
The essential requirements of due process, and all that respondents seek or the Court 
of Appeals required, are notice and an opportunity to respond. . . . The tenured public 
employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation 
of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story.   
 95. But of course, this right is limited in scope. And the Loudermill hearing need not be 
exhaustive, particularly when there exists a post-termination opportunity to appeal. As the Court 
reiterated near the end of the opinion, “We conclude that all the process that is due is provided by 
a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative 
procedures as provided by the Ohio statute.” Id. at 547–48.  
 96. SHEPHERD DISCIPLINARY REPORT, supra note 3 (providing summary under  
“Specification” subheading).  
 97. Id.   
 98. Id.  
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history.99 Finally, he argued that he was treated differently than other 
officers who engaged in similar conduct, in part because of his race. 
(Officer Shepherd is Black.)100  
After hearing all the evidence during this Loudermill 
proceeding, Chief O’Toole issued a fairly detailed written decision.101 In 
it, she said that she found Officer Shepherd’s competing experts to be 
“unconvincing” and believed that his arguments conflated lawfulness 
under the Fourth Amendment with permissibility under Seattle’s  
more stringent use of force policy.102 She then walked through a  
detailed assessment of how she believed Officer Shepherd’s conduct 
violated the use of force policy and warranted termination of his  
employment, particularly when viewed in conjunction with his previous  
disciplinary history.103  
Attached to the end of Chief O’Toole’s findings was a page 
entitled “Appeal of Final Disposition,” which laid out Officer Shepherd’s 
options for challenging the decision she issued in the Loudermill 
hearing.104 As discussed in the next Section, even after a police 
supervisor issues a disciplinary decision, this is often just the beginning 
of the process. Before the punishment is final, officers must ordinarily 
be given a chance to appeal.  
B. Disciplinary Appeals 
Once an officer receives a disciplinary sentence issued by a police 
supervisor, civilian review board, or city administrator, the officer 
generally has an opportunity to appeal the decision.105 Prior studies 
suggest that many police departments afford officers with similar 
appeal procedures. To begin with, departments commonly give officers 
multiple layers of appeal, normally culminating in binding arbitration 
as a final layer of protection.106 Communities use a couple of common 
 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. (providing Chief O’Toole’s decision under “Determination of the Chief” subheading).  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. (“You previously received a ten day suspension in 2009 for violating a different SPD 
policy where your failure resulted in the death of a victim; as such, you should be acutely aware of 
the potentially dire consequences of disregarding policies created to protect the public.”).  
 104. Id.  
 105. In some cities, this appeals process helps bolster an otherwise informal or less rigorous 
earlier determination that an officer engaged in misconduct. The law allows the original 
Loudermill hearing to be relatively cursory in jurisdictions where officers are granted a full 
hearing on appeal. In other jurisdictions, officers are afforded elaborate or robust hearings both in 
the initial predisciplinary hearing and on appeal in a postdisciplinary hearing.  
 106. Rushin, supra note 25, at 571 (“The median police department in the dataset offers police 
officers up to four layers of appellate review in disciplinary cases.”).  
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approaches to select the identity of arbitrators that will hear these 
appeals. Some unionized agencies negotiate over the identity of the 
outside arbitrator that will hear appeals as part of the collective 
bargaining process. More commonly, though, police departments 
employ an alternative strike process or some similar selection 
methodology.107 Under this selection method, the parties are presented 
with a panel of arbitrators.108 Each side then alternatively strikes one 
name from this panel until a single name remains.109 That person then 
becomes the arbitrator for the appeal.110  
After the parties have selected an arbitrator, many communities 
give this decisionmaker authority to conduct something akin to a de 
novo hearing to review conclusions reached by management.111 During 
this hearing, the arbitrator is often tasked with determining whether 
“just cause” existed for the disciplinary action, and the employer bears 
the burden of proving its case by a preponderance of the evidence or, in 
some cases, by clear and convincing evidence.112 In defining “just cause,” 
it is common for arbitrators to employ the so-called Daugherty test, or 
to employ an understanding of “just cause” that resembles this test.113 
This seven-prong test, developed by Arbitrator Carroll Daugherty in 
1964, asks:  
1. Did the Employer give the employee forewarning or foreknowledge of the possible or 
probable consequences of the employee’s disciplinary conduct?  
2. Was the Employer’s rule or managerial order reasonably related to (a) the orderly, 
efficient, and safe operation of the Employer’s business, and (b) the performance that the 
Employer might properly expect of the employee?  
 
 107. See, e.g., Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the City of Fairbanks and Public 
Safety Employees Association, Fairbanks Police Department Chapter Local 83, at 11 (Dec. 23, 
2011), http://www.psea.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2011-City-PSEA-CBA-agreement-04-03-
12-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK3X-2YUV] (establishing alternative striking methodology from 
prearranged list of arbitrators); Agreement Between City of Corpus Christi and the Corpus Christi 
Police Officers’ Association 18–19 (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.corpuschristipoa.net/ 
docs/contracts/2015_2019_City_CCPOA_FINAL_CONTRACT.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4S8-VQZR] 
[hereinafter Corpus Christi Agreement] (establishing alternative strike procedure). 
 108. Corpus Christi Agreement, supra note 107, at 19 (providing that the department should 
receive a panel of seven assigned arbitrators from the National Academy of Arbitrators or another 
qualified agency). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Rushin, supra note 25, at 576–78 (explaining that around 70% of the jurisdictions in that 
study provide a de novo hearing on appeal).  
 112. Tyler Adams, Note, Factors in Police Misconduct Arbitration Outcomes: What Does It 
Take to Fire a Bad Cop?, 32 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133, 140–41 (2016) (describing the 
commonality of these standards in review of police disciplinary cases).  
 113. John J. Hindera & Jyl J. Josephson, Reinventing the Public Employer-Employee 
Relationship: The Just Cause Standard, 22 PUB. ADMIN. Q.  98, 105 (1998) (quoting Enter. Wire, 
Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BL) 359, 363–64 (1966) (Daugherty, Arb.)) (discussing the seven-prong 
Daugherty test).  
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3. Did the Employer, before administering the discipline to an employee, make an effort 
to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey a rule or order  
of management?  
4. Was the Employer’s investigation conducted fairly and objectively?  
5. At the investigation, did the “judge” obtain substantial proof that the employee was 
guilty as charged? 
6. Has the Employer applied its rules, orders and penalties evenhandedly and without 
discrimination to all employees? 
7. Was the degree of discipline administered by the Employer in a particular case 
reasonably related to (a) the seriousness of the employee’s proven offense, and (b) the 
record of the employee in his service with the Employer? 114   
While this test is referenced frequently in police disciplinary 
appeals, it is by no means a rigid or exhaustive standard of review. As 
one arbitrator remarked in a police arbitration award from Michigan, 
“although it is hard to define, a good arbitrator knows whether just 
cause exists when s/he reviews the facts, evidence and testimony in the 
case that has been presented to him or her for decision.”115 In any event, 
“just cause” standards generally provide arbitrators with broad 
authority to review the sufficiency of the evidence presented against the 
officer, the procedural due process protections afforded to the officer 
during the investigation and earlier adjudication, the proportionality  
of the punishment to the alleged offense, and the consistency  
of the punishment with that given to other officers accused of  
similar wrongdoing.116  
Although collective bargaining agreements and internal 
departmental policies describe arbitration in this context as an appeal, 
that name may be a bit of a misnomer, at least as we normally use the 
word in other areas of law. In the American justice system, appeals are 
normally limited in scope.117 For example, while litigants may be able 
to challenge to an appellate court the legal decisions made at their trial, 
litigants often have little opportunity to challenge factual findings 
made by juries or punishments issued by trial courts within the 
statutorily authorized range.118 In most cases, appeals in our criminal 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. In re Emp. & Police Officers Ass’n of Mich., 137 BNA LA (BL) 1534, 1542 (2017) (Scales, 
Arb.) (emphasis omitted) (redacted).  
 116. See Hindera & Josephson, supra note 113, at 106–10 (discussing the procedural due 
process goals served by the just cause standard). 
 117. Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial 
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and 
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 993 (1986) (concluding that in the United States, 
“appellate courts almost never decide cases de novo”).  
 118. Id. (noting that the “primary function” of an appellate court is to correct legal errors made 
at the trial court below).  
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justice system involve challenging the procedural sufficiency of the 
earlier trial, not the substantive findings of the jury, unless those 
findings are clearly erroneous or unreasonable.119  
By contrast, appeals of internal disciplinary action against 
police officers operate, effectively, as an opportunity to re-adjudicate the 
matter in front of an arbitrator, with the disciplinary sentence issued 
by the police department as a ceiling for the possible punishment. This 
realization has significant implications for the practical ability of a 
community to oversee its police department. Take the example of 
Detroit, Michigan, which has created a seemingly powerful civilian 
review board.120 This seven-person board purports to be one of the few 
in the United States to have the power to subpoena information, 
conduct independent investigations, and discipline officers.121 At first 
glance, Detroit looks like a model of civilian control of law enforcement. 
But like most big cities, Detroit has established a disciplinary appeals 
process that allows officers to challenge to an arbitrator any discipline 
handed down by the city or the civilian review board.122 And the officers’ 
union contract grants this arbitrator authority to determine 
independently whether just cause exists for punishment.123 This 
procedural redundancy may diminish the practical importance of the 
city’s civilian oversight apparatus, because “[t]he ultimate power 
resides with an appellate arbitrator.”124 
As discussed in more detail in the Article, this transferring of 
oversight ability from democratically accountable actors to arbitrators 
may result in relatively frequent reductions in officer discipline. And, 
as Judge Thelton Henderson of the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California explained, “[j]ust like any failure to impose 
appropriate discipline by the (police) chief or city administrator, any 
reversal of appropriate discipline at arbitration undermines the very 
objectives” of any police reform effort.125  
 
 119. Id. at 993–95; see also Robert L. Stern, Review of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A 
Comparative Analysis, 58 HARV. L. REV. 70, 72 (1944) (explaining how, ordinarily, determinations 
of facts by earlier adjudicators are treated with “considerable, though varying degrees of, respect” 
on appeal).  
 120. Ofer, supra note 80, app. at 1055.  
 121. Id. at 1043 (“[T]he only review board that has a leadership structure that is not majority 
nominated by the mayor and is empowered with subpoena, disciplinary, and policy review 
authorities, is Detroit’s.”).  
 122. Master Agreement Between the City of Detroit and the Detroit Police Officers Association 
11–16 (Oct. 2014), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/55a26d54 
e4b02ee06b2a86ed/1436708180775/Detroit+police+contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/83U7-ZKC6]. 
 123. Id. at 11–13. 
 124. Rushin, supra note 25, at 583.  
 125. Matthew Artz, Judge Orders Investigation into Oakland’s Police Arbitration Losses, 
MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/08/14/judge-orders-investigation-into-
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II. EXISTING LITERATURE 
A handful of existing academic studies have found that 
arbitration is the most common mechanism for adjudicating police 
disciplinary appeals. And a number of media examinations have found 
that a significant number of police disciplinary appeals result in the 
reversal or reduction of disciplinary penalties against officers. 
Nevertheless, less research has examined the outcomes of police 
disciplinary appeals—specifically, the outcomes of appellate arbitration 
in police disciplinary cases. As this Part explains, this study seeks to 
consider this important research question. The existing studies roughly 
fall into three general categories.  
First, some prior studies have found that arbitration is a 
common feature of police disciplinary appeals across American police 
departments.126 Because these arbitrators often reevaluate police 
discipline in de novo proceedings, at least one scholar has concluded 
that arbitrators—and not civilian review boards, police chiefs, or 
mayors—are the “true adjudicators of internal discipline” in the United 
States.127 These findings were roughly consistent with other prior 
research that concluded that arbitration was a common feature of police 
disciplinary procedures and police union contracts.128 Nevertheless, 
these existing studies do not explore the outcomes of police disciplinary 
procedures. Instead, they are focused on the procedural choices made 
by cities in developing disciplinary appeals procedures.  
Second, a few legal studies have hypothesized about the ways in 
which arbitration in police disciplinary cases may impede 
accountability. Most notably, Professor Mark Iris conducted two in-
depth case studies examining the disciplinary appeals process in 
 
oaklands-police-arbitration-losses (last updated Aug. 12, 2016, 7:03 AM) [https://perma.cc/7LZC-
HRRM]. 
 126. For example, one recent study, which examined the police disciplinary appeals procedures 
articulated in 656 law enforcement collective bargaining agreements from a geographically diverse 
range of police departments, found binding arbitration to be common. Rushin, supra note 25. For 
other examples, see infra note 128.  
 127. Id. at 582.  
 128. A number of prior studies by academics and civil rights activists point to arbitration as a 
potential problem stemming from collective bargaining agreements or state and local laws. See, 
e.g., DERAY MCKESSON, SAMUEL SINYANGWE, JOHNETTA ELZIE & BRITTNEY PACKNETT, CAMPAIGN 
ZERO, POLICE UNION CONTRACTS AND POLICE BILL OF RIGHTS ANALYSIS (2016), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/5773f695f7e0abbdfe28a1f0/14
67217560243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Union+Contract+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBG8-
TEQR] (identifying how contracts can vest authority in nondemocratic actors in a way that limits 
community oversight of police); Rad, supra note 91, at 51–52 (identifying arbitration as a potential 
barrier to accountability).  
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Chicago129 and Houston.130 He found that in both jurisdictions, 
arbitrators in the aggregate routinely cut police discipline roughly in 
half.131 This Article’s study is distinct from and builds on Professor Iris’s 
prior work. Professor Iris’s studies looked at individual jurisdictions. As 
Professor Iris wondered in his most recent study from 2002, “Can this 
pattern [found in Chicago and Houston] be documented in yet another 
major city police agency? This is a tantalizing question that for now 
remains unanswered. This suggests a fruitful area for future 
research.”132 This study builds on Professor Iris’s work by answering his 
call for more expansive future research into police arbitrations.  
Third, a few media examinations have explored the outcomes of 
police disciplinary appeals, particularly as they relate to the rehiring of 
previously terminated officers. Most prominently, Kimbriell Kelly, 
Wesley Lowery, and Steven Rich of the Washington Post conducted one 
of the most well-known studies on the rehiring of fired officers.133 They 
found that over a ten-year period, nearly 24% of officers terminated in 
thirty-seven agencies were rehired on appeal.134 And they found that 
the disciplinary appeals processes in some police departments—like 
those in San Antonio, Denver, and Philadelphia—have forced the 
departments to rehire the large majority of terminated officers.135 A 
 
 129. See Iris, supra note 38. 
 130. See Iris, supra note 55.  
 131. Id. at 141–42 tbl.1 (showing that of the 899 total days of suspension issued between 1994 
and 1998 in the City of Houston, 480 days were upheld and 419 days were overturned, suggesting 
“[c]ollectively the individual cases add up to a systematic pattern of arbitrators reducing the 
disciplinary actions of the chief of police by close to 50%”).   
 132. Id. at 147 (citation omitted). It is also worth noting that in laying out a roadmap for future 
research on arbitration, Iris speculated that some commercially available databases are not 
representative of the universe of all police arbitration opinions. Id. This study addresses this very 
problem by combining data from one comprehensive state database in Minnesota (which reports 
all cases processed by the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services) with one of the largest national 
databases. As explained in more detail in Part IV, the results of this study suggest that arbitrators 
across the 512 arbitration opinions in the Bloomberg database behaved nearly identically overall 
to arbitrators in the 112 arbitration opinions in Minnesota. And arbitrators in both databases 
reached mostly identical results to the arbitrators in Iris’s smaller examinations of opinions in 
Houston and Chicago. Put simply, this Article responds to the call for more research proposed by 
Iris nearly twenty years ago and finds through a national analysis that his observations about the 
arbitration process are not just true in Chicago and Houston, but possibly in jurisdictions all across 
the country. Additionally, Iris conducted his studies around two or more decades ago. And unlike 
the present study, Iris spent less time considering the arbitrators’ justifications for reducing or 
reversing discipline. By conducting a wider, national examination of a larger number of arbitration 
outcomes and supplementing this with normative recommendations for reforming the police 
disciplinary appeals process, this study updates, builds on, and expands Professor Iris ’s  
important work.  
 133. See Kelly et al., supra note 31. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. (showing that 31 of 44 officers fired in San Antonio were ordered rehired, as were 44 
of 71 in Philadelphia, and 21 of 31 in Denver).  
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number of other reporters have found similar patterns, in individual 
agencies or across individual states, of departments being forced to 
rehire previously terminated officers after appeals. For example, Jon 
Collins of Minnesota Public Radio found around half of all officers 
terminated across Minnesota over a five-year period got their jobs back 
via arbitration on appeal.136 
While important, these media investigations leave many 
important questions unanswered. For one thing, several of these 
examinations have been focused on a handful of large police 
departments that may not be representative of the country as a whole. 
These prior examinations have also focused primarily on disciplinary 
terminations, not other types of discipline (like suspensions, demotions, 
or written reprimands) that are also appealable to arbitration.137 
Additionally, these prior media examinations were outcome oriented. 
Their focus was on the frequency of officers getting rehired; they did not 
systematically explore the justifications given for these rehiring 
decisions or the procedures employed to arrive at this result. To the 
extent that existing appellate procedures for police officers may result 
in undesirable outcomes—namely, the rehiring of unfit officers—it is 
important to study this procedure in-depth rather than just the 
outcomes of police disciplinary systems more generally.  
One recent study has examined arbitrators’ justifications for 
rehiring terminated officers. Tyler Adams conducted one of the few 
existing studies to date on the outcomes of police arbitrations by 
examining a dataset of ninety-two police arbitration decisions 
challenging officer terminations.138 While important, Adams’s study 
 
 136. Jon Collins, Half of Fired Minnesota Police Officers Get Their Jobs Back Through 
Arbitration, MINN. PUB. RADIO (July 9, 2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/ 
2020/07/09/half-of-fired-minnesota-police-officers-get-their-jobs-back-through-arbitration 
[https://perma.cc/9BBC-BULD] (relying on data from the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation 
Services). This mirrors a slew of similar local news reports that have found that police officers 
frequently succeed in overturning disciplinary action on appeal. For example, Robert Angien and 
Dan Horn of the Cincinnati Enquirer found that roughly a quarter of disciplinary suspensions 
were reduced or reversed in that city, while a similar examination by Jodi S. Cohen of ProPublica 
and Jennifer Smith Richards of the Chicago Tribune found that sanctions are reversed or 
remanded in around 85% of cases in Chicago. Robert Angien & Dan Horn, Police Discipline 
Inconsistent: Sanctions Most Likely to Be Reduced, CIN. ENQUIRER, Oct. 21, 2001, at A1; Jennifer 
Smith Richards & Jodi S. Cohen, Cop Disciplinary System Undercut, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 14, 2017), 
http://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx?guid=bc73d166-b1f0-4d8b-
9ff9-0529bad5bd7a [https://perma.cc/L9FM-9A2P]; see also Dan Stamm, Police Commish Angry 
that 90 Percent of Fired Officers Get Jobs Back, NBC PHILA., http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/ 
news/local/Police-Officers-Get-Jobs-Back-194100131.html (last updated Mar. 1, 2013, 11:02 AM) 
[https://perma.cc/46QM-D793]. 
 137. See, e.g., Kelly et al., supra note 31 (focusing exclusively on firing and rehiring of officers).  
 138. Adams, supra note 112. Adams examined the Bloomberg database, which this study also 
partially relies upon. He found that in rehiring terminated officers, arbitrators commonly cited 
inadequate investigations, lack of proof about the guilt of the discharged officer, and mitigating 
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does not foreclose the need for additional research on this topic. This 
Article builds on Adams’s important work in several ways—by 
analyzing a larger dataset of police arbitration awards over a longer 
period of time,139 by focusing on a somewhat different set of variables,140 
and by expanding the analysis of police arbitration awards to not just 
those involving terminations, but also those involving suspensions, 
written reprimands, demotions, or other forms of discipline. This 
further builds our understanding of the role of arbitration in the police 
disciplinary process across the country.   
Perhaps most importantly, though, this Article reaches a 
different conclusion than Adams’s study. Adams argues that it is 
unfortunate that, “due to the media’s propensity for circulating 
sensationalist headlines, they rarely provide complete and accurate 
accounts of the details of police misconduct arbitration decisions.”141 He 
ultimately concludes that departments themselves, not arbitrators or 
the procedural choices made by jurisdictions in employing arbitration, 
are often to blame for the high rate of officer reinstatements. In his 
view, arbitrators—and the system of arbitration generally—serve an 
important role because, unlike the department, “arbitrators care about 
who the officer is. They care about whether an officer is sufficiently 
trustworthy to deserve a second chance.”142     
As explained in Part V, this Article reaches a somewhat 
different, although not necessarily inconsistent, conclusion. It argues 
that while appellate arbitration can (and does) help correct some 
particularly egregious cases of unjustified or excessive punishment, the 
existing system as described in this Article may also raise broader 
questions about officer accountability, democratic accountability, and 
organizational management of police departments. In doing so, the 
methodology employed by this Article seeks to contribute to the existing 
literature, as described in the next Part.  
 
circumstances in the officer’s personnel file. Id. at 133–34, 146–152. He also conducted nuanced 
analyses of the standard of proof required by arbitrators in these cases and the percentage of cases 
involving off-duty behavior or direct mistreatment of citizens. Id. at 140–41, 153–54.  
 139. By bringing together state and national databases, this study looks at over six hundred 
arbitration decisions across twenty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico over 
fifteen years.  
 140. The present study codes these decisions based on eighteen different variables, some of 
which are informed by the studies of police arbitration by Adams, Iris, Rushin, and other prior 
scholars, but still represent my own personal choices about the appropriate variable definitions 
and applications for this particular project.  
 141. Adams, supra note 112, at 135.  
 142. Id. at 156.  
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This Article examines a dataset of 624 arbitration opinions 
involving police disciplinary appeals decided between 2006 and 2020, 
constructed through sorting and combining arbitration awards from 
two separate resources: (1) the Bloomberg Law Labor Arbitration 
Awards database, one of the largest available commercial databases, 
and (2) the Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services, one of the only 
publicly accessible state databases of police arbitration awards.143  
In sorting both databases, I focused specifically on opinions 
involving police officers, sheriff’s deputies, and other similar law 
enforcement professionals. I removed any cases dealing with 
corrections officers, security guards, and police dispatchers.144 This left 
a dataset of 624 arbitration opinions related to disciplinary appeals for 
police officers authored by over two hundred different arbitrators in at 
least twenty-eight states,145 Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. 
Of the 624 opinions analyzed as part of this Article, 333 of them 
involved appeals of officer terminations. Another 257 of the cases 
involved officers appealing suspensions. And thirty-four cases involved 
officers appealing other types of disciplinary actions like letters of 
written reprimand, demotions, or loss of job responsibilities.  
The dataset represents a wide and diverse sample of American 
law enforcement agencies. It includes many cases from the primary 
municipal police departments in several of the nation’s largest cities, 
 
 143. Arbitration Awards, MINN. BUREAU OF MEDIATION SERVS., https://mn.gov/bms/ 
arbitration/awards (last visited Jan. 28, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6DUC-RMNJ]. In looking at both 
the Bloomberg database and the Minnesota database, this study combines two databases used in 
prior academic and media examinations of police arbitration awards. See Adams, supra note 112 
(conducting a similar examination of the Bloomberg database over a shorter period of time and 
focused on a smaller number of cases); Collins, supra note 136 (also conducting a similar analysis 
of the Minnesota database over a shorter period of time and focused on a smaller number of cases).  
 144. From the Bloomberg database, this removed approximately 317 arbitration awards. This 
required reviewing each case individually to sort them based on the exact job description of  
the grievant.  
 145. These states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington. In a number of the opinions, the 
location of the department, including the state, was redacted because of state law, local ordinances, 
or the department’s collective bargaining agreement. Thus, the total number of states represented 
in this dataset is likely larger than twenty-eight.  
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including Austin, Texas;146 Chicago, Illinois;147 Cleveland, Ohio;148 
Columbus, Ohio;149 Fort Worth, Texas;150 Honolulu, Hawaii;151 Houston, 
Texas;152 Minneapolis, Minnesota;153 Newark, New Jersey;154 Oakland, 
California;155 Omaha, Nebraska;156 Saint Paul, Minnesota;157 San Jose, 
California;158 and Tulsa, Oklahoma.159 The dataset also includes cases 
from police departments in medium-sized communities, like 
Chesterfield, Michigan;160 Kalamazoo, Michigan;161 Killeen, Texas;162 
Pharr, Texas;163 Stillwater, Oklahoma;164 Waco, Texas;165 Woodbury, 
 
 146. City of Austin v. Combined L. Enf’t Ass’n of Tex., 123 BNA LA (BL) 1042 (Dec. 9, 2006) 
(Guttshall, Arb.).  
 147. City of Chi. Dep’t of Police v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 7, 07-150,  2008 BNA LA 
Supp. (BL) 119401 (Dec. 23, 2008) (Bierig, Arb.).  
 148. City of Cleveland v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 8, 53-390-L-00425-09, 127 BNA 
LA (BL) 1620 (Am. Arb. Ass’n May 19, 2010) (Ruben, Arb.).  
 149. City of Columbus v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Cap. City Lodge No. 9, 2010 BNA LA Supp. 
(BL) 118947 (June 26, 2010) (Goldberg, Arb.).  
 150. City of Fort Worth, CSC-01-2010-HP, 127 BNA LA (BL) 1021 (May 15, 2010)  
(Moore, Arb.).  
 151. Honolulu Police Dep’t v. State of Haw. Org. of Police Officers, 0-2007-003, 127 BNA LA 
(BL) 148 (Oct. 23, 2009) (Henner, Arb.).  
 152. City of Hous. Police Dep’t v. Individual Grievant, 70-390-00502-10, 128 BNA LA (BL) 910 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Dec. 22, 2010) (Moore, Arb.).  
 153. Police Officers Fed’n of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of Mediation 
Servs. Dec. 30, 2015) (Jacobs, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20151230-Mpls.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U57Q-7H9L].  
 154. City of Newark v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Newark Lodge 12, 04-0534, 122 BNA LA (BL) 
242 (N.J. Bureau of Mediation Jan. 4, 2006) (Smith, Arb.).  
 155. City of Oakland v. Oakland Police Officers’ Ass’n, 09-0707, 128 BNA LA (BL) 1217 (Mar. 
2, 2011) (Gaba, Arb.).  
 156. Omaha Police Union, Local 101 v. City of Omaha, FMCS 07-03391, 2007 BNA LA Supp. 
(BL) 119735 (Dec. 5, 2007) (Fincher, Arb.).  
 157. Saint Paul Police Fed’n v. City of Saint Paul (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Oct. 12, 
2012) (Befort, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20121012-St--Paul-Police.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/KNG8-JGKD]. 
 158. City of San Jose v. Individual Grievant, ARB-10-0153, 129 BNA LA (BL) 1313 (Nov. 15, 
2011) (Reeves, Arb.). 
 159. City of Tulsa v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 93, 10/60154, 130 BNA LA (BL) 714 (May 
21, 2012) (McReynolds, Arb.). 
 160. Charter Twp. of Chesterfield v. Police Officers Lab. Council (POLC) Union, 09-55992, 
2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 119375 (Jan. 12, 2010) (McDonald, Arb.).  
 161. City of Kalamazoo v. Kalamazoo Pub. Safety Officers Ass’n, 54-390-00148-09, 128 BNA 
LA (BL) 749 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Nov. 12, 2010) (Hornberger, Arb.).  
 162. City of Killeen v. Police Officer T.B., AAA Case A 71 390 00789 09, 2010 BNA LA Supp. 
(BL) 118818 (Am. Arb. Ass’n May 10, 2010) (Jennings, Arb.).  
 163. City of Pharr v. Combined Law Enf’t Ass’n of Tex., 127 BNA LA (BL) 1025 (May 15, 2010) 
(Jennings, Arb.).  
 164. City of Stillwater v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 102, 12/51012-1, 130 BNA LA (BL) 
913 (May 8, 2012) (Chapdelaine, Arb.).  
 165. City of Waco v. Sergeant P.M., 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 118819 (May 15, 2010) 
(Jennings, Arb.).  
          
1050 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:4:1023 
Minnesota;166 and Youngstown, Ohio.167 And the dataset includes many 
cases from small police departments, including those in places like 
Eaton, Ohio;168 Hialeah Gardens, Florida;169 Markham, Illinois;170 
Milford, Michigan;171 Piqua, Ohio;172 Sandy, Oregon;173 and 
Taylorsville, Illinois.174 Finally, the dataset includes arbitration awards 
from numerous sheriff’s departments, including those in places like 
Erie County175 and Hamilton County176 in Ohio, and San Joaquin 
County177 and Yuba County178 in California. It also includes several 
cases involving federal law enforcement agencies.179  
It is important to recognize the limitations of this merged 
dataset. Per the terms of local collective bargaining agreements or 
municipal ordinances, many arbitration hearings are confidential, 
meaning that those awards will not be included in this dataset.180 
 
 166. City of Woodbury v. Woodbury Police Officers Ass’n, 09-PA-0952, 2010 BNA LA Supp. 
(BL) 118973 (Aug. 16, 2010) (Bognanno, Arb.).  
 167. City of Youngstown v. Ohio Patrolman’s Benevolent Ass’n, 2011 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
119807 (Mar. 10, 2011) (Paolucci, Arb.).  
 168. City of Eaton v. FOP/Ohio Lab. Council, 14/01484-6, 134 BNA LA (BL) 672 (Sept. 12, 
2014) (Tolley, Arb.).  
 169. City of Hialeah Gardens v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Fla. State Lodge, 32-390-00161-10, 
128 BNA LA (BL) 367 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Aug. 23, 2010) (Wolfson, Arb.).   
 170. City of Markham Police Dep’t v. State and Mun. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Loc. 
726, 08/072, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 119262 (Feb. 11, 2010) (Goldstein, Arb.).  
 171. Vill. of Milford v. Police Officers Council, Grievance: #10-34/J.R, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
119906 (Dec. 28, 2010) (McDonald, Arb.).  
 172. City of Piqua v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, 01/14, 133 BNA LA (BL) 1811 (Sept. 3, 2014) 
(Weatherspoon, Arb.).  
 173. City of Sandy v. Sandy Police Ass’n, 129 BNA LA (BL) 669 (Aug. 12, 2011)  
(Calhoun, Arb.).  
 174. City of Taylorville v. Policeman’s Benevolent Lab. Comm., 0955293, 129 BNA LA (BL) 
616 (June 23, 2011) (Goldstein, Arb.).  
 175. Erie Cnty. Sheriff v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, Inc., 110310/01887-6, 
129 BNA LA (BL) 1070 (Oct. 18, 2011) (Heekin, Arb.).  
 176. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, Inc., 05-
03516-8, 2006 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 119785 (Apr. 18, 2006) (Cohen, Arb.).  
 177. County of San Joaquin v. San Joaquin Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n, 128 BNA LA (BL) 1096 
(Dec. 16, 2010) (Riker, Arb.).  
 178. Deputy Sheriff’s Ass’n v. Cnty. of Yuba, 74 390 00172 10, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL)  
119463 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Oct. 16, 2010) (Riker, Arb.).  
 179. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Customs & Border Prot. v. Nat’l Border Patrol 
Council of the Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 10/0826-04759-3,129 BNA LA (BL) 1464 (Nov. 21, 2011) 
(Skulina, Arb.); U.S. Customs & Border Prot. v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 129 BNA LA (BL) 
1461 (Dec. 19, 2011) (Abrams, Arb.).  
 180. See, e.g., Agreement Between Illinois FOP Labor Council and City of Champaign Patrol 
and Sergeant 66 (July 1, 2015), http://documents.ci.champaign.il.us/v/ 
0B8wlv3QqeZtnT0h6elh0RVE2WTQ [https://perma.cc/KDR2-TXFC] (establishing a confidential 
proceeding); Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Colton and the Colton Police 
Officers Association 7 (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.ci.colton.ca.us/DocumentCenter/ 
View/3436/2017-05-16-MOU---Colton-Police-Officers-Association-Term-020117---013119?bidId= 
[https://perma.cc/U9MB-JR4K] (“Grievance arbitration hearings shall be private.”).   
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Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the combined dataset 
constructed for this Article provides a somewhat reasonably 
representative sample of police arbitration outcomes. First, at least one 
prior study found that jurisdictions across the country use similar 
procedures for adjudicating police disciplinary appeals.181 The majority 
of collective bargaining agreements dictate a fairly similar disciplinary 
appeals process—one that involves arbitrators, selected through 
alternative strike processes (or similar selection procedures) issuing 
binding rulings after de novo hearings.182 Indeed, nearly all of the 
arbitration opinions in the present dataset used this same basic 
procedural process. Given these procedural similarities across police 
disciplinary appeals, the size of the dataset, the fifteen-year period 
covered by the dataset, and the wide geographical variation in the 
dataset, it seems possible that the dataset provides a useful cross 
section of police arbitration decisions in the United States.  
And second, the overall outcomes of police arbitration are nearly 
identical when limiting analysis to the Bloomberg database, the 
Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services database, or the combined 
database. That is to say, when I analyzed the 512 opinions derived from 
the Bloomberg database exclusively, the 112 opinions derived from the 
Minnesota Bureau of Mediation Services exclusively, or the 624 
opinions from the combined database, the overall outcomes—including 
the types of alleged misconduct, the rate of reversals, and the 
justifications for reversals—are substantially similar in the aggregate. 
This provides some confidence that the overall dataset is potentially 
representative of the predictable outcomes of police arbitration as 
currently employed in most American jurisdictions.  
Once I collected and sorted this dataset, I developed relevant 
coding variables and definitions. In order to do this in a manner 
consistent with prior studies of police policies,183 I conducted a 
preliminary examination of the dataset and surveyed the existing 
 
 181. Rushin, supra note 25, at 570–71 tbl.2 (showing the common features of arbitration 
appeals procedures across the country).   
 182. Id.  
 183. See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Police Splits, 68 
ALA. L. REV. 395, 423–24 (2016) (conducting a detailed coding of body camera policies from the 
largest one hundred police departments); Joanna Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 
YALE L.J. 1, 19–25 (2017) (describing a similar methodology for coding cases to examine the effects 
of qualified immunity); Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1217 (2017) 
(also coding police labor agreements in a similar manner to observe patterns across a dataset that 
can inform theory); MARY D. FAN, CAMERA POWER: PROOF, POLICING, PRIVACY, AND AUDIOVISUAL 
BIG DATA (2019) (conducting a more extensive coding of even more body camera policies from more 
agencies); Rushin, supra note 25, at 566–70 (describing use of similar methodology); Stephen 
Rushin & Atticus DeProspo, Interrogating Police Officers, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 662–68 
(2019) (similarly describing this type of methodology).  
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literature discussed in Part II. Ultimately, after this iterative process, 
I settled on eighteen variables that help illustrate the outcomes of 
arbitration in police disciplinary cases. These variables fall into three 
general groups. First, I included six variables that summarized the 
general case characteristics and outcome, including basic information 
like the name of the arbitrator, a short summary of the alleged offense, 
the prevailing party in the arbitration proceeding, the disciplinary 
sentence before arbitration, the disciplinary sentence after arbitration, 
and the final disciplinary sentence expressed as a percentage of the 
original disciplinary sentence. Second, I included nine variables 
designed to categorize the wide range of alleged misconduct found in 
the dataset. After a preliminary review of the dataset, I sorted the cases 
into the most common types of misconduct, including dishonesty, 
domestic offenses, uses of force or incidents of violence, failures by 
officers to act, racist or homophobic remarks, sexual impropriety, 
substance abuse, traffic violations, and other general technical 
violations. Finally, I added an additional three variables designed to 
document the most common justifications for arbitrators revising or 
overturning disciplinary action against officers: procedural, 
proportionality, and evidentiary justifications.  
Coding this dataset across these eighteen variables resulted in 
11,232 coding decisions. It is important to recognize that not every case 
fit neatly into these coding variable definitions. In a small number of 
cases, I had to exercise my own judgment in categorizing the type of 
offense or the arbitrator’s justification for reducing or overturning 
discipline. And in some cases, alleged offenses fit into multiple 
categories, as did the arbitrator’s justification for reversals or 
reductions in discipline. The next Part describes the results of  
this analysis.  
IV. OUTCOMES OF POLICE ARBITRATION 
Arbitrators overturned or reduced roughly half of all disciplinary 
penalties issued by police chiefs, sheriffs, and city leaders. This finding 
is roughly consistent with prior examinations of police arbitration 
outcomes by Adams184 and Collins.185 These findings are also potentially 
consistent with those by Kelly, Lowery, and Rich.186 Even though Kelly, 
Lowery, and Rich found that a mere 24% of all officers terminated 
 
 184. Adams, supra note 112, at 140 (finding in his analysis that a similar rate—46.7%—of 
discharges were overturned via arbitration).  
 185. Collins, supra note 136 (finding that roughly half of disciplinary cases in Minnesota 
resulted in reversals or reductions).  
 186. See Kelly et al., supra note 31.  
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across thirty-seven agencies were rehired on appeal, their dataset 
seemingly included both cases that advanced to arbitration and those 
that did not (for example, cases where the union or aggrieved officer 
chose not to appeal discipline, or cases where the union reached a 
settlement agreement with management prior to arbitration).187 This 
study, by contrast, focuses exclusively on disciplinary appeals that 
advance to arbitration. It seems plausible that unions or aggrieved 
officers may choose not to challenge some disciplinary sanctions or 
terminations because of the low probability of success on appeal. This 
could skew the resulting arbitration outcomes as described in more 
detail in Part V.  
Overall, in the context of the present dataset, arbitrators 
reduced the length of the average suspension by about half. And in 
roughly half of all cases of terminations, arbitrators ordered the officer 
rehired on appeal. Further, arbitrators most commonly cited 
proportionality concerns in reducing or overturning discipline. It was 
comparatively rarer—although not uncommon—for arbitrators to 
upend disciplinary sanctions because of disagreements with the factual 
findings or concerns about the procedural defects in the earlier 
investigation or adjudication of wrongdoing. The sections that follow 
describe the types of misconduct that advanced to arbitration on appeal, 
the rates of reversals and reductions of discipline, and the justifications 
given by arbitrators in altering disciplinary penalties.  
A. Types of Misconduct Appealed to Arbitration 
The types of misconduct that progressed on appeal to arbitration 
vary widely. Some of this misconduct is serious and involves significant 
harm to other people in a manner rarely seen in other professions. 
Other misconduct is relatively minor and similar to the kind of 
misconduct we might expect to find in any workplace. Table 1 
summarizes the distribution of offenses that advanced to arbitration  





 187. See id.  
 188. It is also important to recognize that this does not represent a complete picture of the 
world of police misconduct generally. Presumably, there are some types of misconduct that officers 
choose to not appeal—perhaps because they realize their chances of success are relatively low, or 
in more minor cases, because they decided to accept the initial punishment without further appeal. 
Thus, it is important to understand what this data can and cannot tell us. It is worth noting that 
some incidents fell into multiple categories. Thus, the numbers in Table 1 will add up to more  
than 624. 
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these included acts of violence against unarmed civilians,194 fellow 
officers,195 children,196 individuals with physical disabilities,197 
individuals experiencing mental health crises,198 animals,199 and 
numerous individuals already in officer custody or in handcuffs.200 
 In nearly a quarter of the cases, supervisors allege officers 
engaged in professional dishonesty, including falsified police reports,201 
lack of candor during investigations,202 withholding information in 
 
 194. See, e.g., –, Union v. Emp., 4654834-AAA, 2018 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 4654834 (Am. Arb. 
Ass’n Oct. 16, 2018) (Zeiser, Arb.) (redacted decision) (case involving officer who killed a burglary 
suspect, faced criminal charges for the killing, and was terminated by his department, only to be 
ordered rehired with back pay by an arbitrator on appeal).   
 195. See, e.g., City of Tulsa v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge 93, FCMS Case No. 10/60154, 
130 BNA LA (BL) 714, 719, 724 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. May 21, 2012) (McReynolds, 
Arb.) (upholding the termination of an officer who choked a fellow officer until she  
lost consciousness).  
 196. See, e.g., Police Command Officers Union v. Emp., 149904-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
149904 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Dec. 26, 2011) (Ryan, Arb.) (upholding the termination of an officer who, 
among other offenses, unjustifiably used force against a juvenile); City of Columbus v. Fraternal 
Ord. of Police, Cap. City Lodge 9, Grievance No. 24-2016, 138 BNA LA (BL) 158, 160, 164 (June 3, 
2017) (Goldberg, Arb.) (overturning three-day suspension for officer who accidentally shot a child).  
 197. See, e.g., City of Slayton v. Slayton Police Officers Ass’n, 138 BNA LA (BL) 1917, 1926–
27 (Oct. 1, 2018) (Latsch, Arb.) (officer allegedly forcibly and unnecessarily removed a paraplegic 
driver from his car, unlawfully arrested him, and used excessive force).  
 198. See, e.g., IBPO Loc. – v. Emp., 148703-AAA, 2012 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148703 (Am. Arb. 
Ass’n Mar. 5, 2012) (Altman, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing the penalty against an officer who 
mishandled a situation, resulting in injuries, with a person experiencing a mental health crisis).  
 199. See, e.g., Ramsey Cnty. v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., BMS Case No. 16-PA-0957, 2016 WL 
6610300, at *1, *3 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Oct. 29, 2016) (Vernon, Arb.) (ordering the 
rehiring, with limitations, of an officer who severely beat his dog while drunk, resulting in animal 
cruelty charges against him).  
 200. See, e.g., Metro. Council v. Teamsters Loc. 320, BMS Case No. 14-PA-1085, 2015 WL 
4931085, at *1–2 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. May 25, 2015) (Jacobs, Arb.) (involving an 
officer who allegedly punched a person who was handcuffed and in custody); City of Blue Island v. 
Ill. Fed’n of Police, FCMS Case No. 16-52757, 137 BNA LA (BL) 845, 846–48 (Fed. Mediation & 
Conciliation Serv. Apr. 10, 2017) (Dichter, Arb.) (arbitrator reducing thirty-day suspension to two-
day suspension for striking a handcuffed suspect).  
 201. See, e.g., Law Enf’t Lab. Servs. Deputy Loc. 212 v. Cnty. of Isanti, BMS Case No. 17-PA-
0050 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Sept. 6, 2017) (Neigh, Arb.), https://mn.gov/ 
bms/documents/BMS/130696-20170906-Isanti.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G5J-JPSQ] (upholding 
termination for falsifying a report, making hostile/harassing calls to another officer, and failing to 
act appropriately in vehicle chase); United Pub. Serv. Emps. Union/COPS Loc. – v. Emp., 4642861-
AAA, 2018 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 4642861 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Apr. 9, 2018) (Williamson, Jr., Arb.) 
(redacted decision) (upholding termination for multiple falsified accident reports). 
 202. See, e.g., Emp. v. Individual Grievant Appellant, 148074-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
148074 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Aug. 4, 2013) (Bennett, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing indefinite 
suspension to five-day suspension in case involving alleged lack of candor by officer).  
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investigations,203 and falsifying time sheets.204 In several of these cases, 
employers sought termination of the officer because of a belief that the 
officer’s dishonesty would require inclusion on a Brady list,205 thereby 
limiting the officer’s ability to serve as an effective witness in a future 
criminal trial.206  
While these large numbers of crimes of violence and dishonesty 
are illuminating, it is important to recognize that the largest segment 
of cases (54.5%) involves technical violations of departmental policy. 
These can range from relatively serious violations of departmental 
policy, like conduct unbecoming of an officer207 and insubordination,208 
to relatively minor offenses, like violations of uniform dress code,209 
 
 203. See, e.g., City of Sandy v. Sandy Police Ass’n, 129 BNA LA (BL) 669, 672, 680 (Aug. 12, 
2011) (Calhoun, Arb.) (ordering officer rehired where officer allegedly withheld information from 
prosecution for a friend).  
 204. See, e.g., Emp. v. Officers Ass’n, 161910-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 161910 (Am. Arb. 
Ass’n June 11, 2010) (McDonald, Arb.) (redacted decision) (termination downgraded to a ninety-
day suspension for providing false information about overtime worked).  
 205. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963) (holding that prosecutors must disclose 
material evidence that may be favorable to a criminal defendant, which can include an officer’s 
prior history of dishonesty or misconduct); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437–38 (1995) 
(concluding that Brady requires the prosecution to turn over evidence known to them). For a 
detailed summary of how police disciplinary records interact with Brady requirements, see 
Jonathan Abel, Brady’s Blind Spot: Impeachment Evidence in Police Personnel Files and the Battle 
Splitting the Prosecution Team, 67 STAN. L. REV. 743, 749–51, 762–79 (2015); see also Rachel 
Moran, Contesting Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1360–79 (2018) (noting the kinds of 
barriers that prevent access to officers’ records, which may shed light on their proclivity  
towards dishonesty).  
 206. See, e.g., City of Lakeland v. W. Cent. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n, FMCS Case No. 
15114/00483, 135 BNA LA (BL) 8 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. June 29, 2015) (Sergent, 
Arb.) (forcing police department to reassign officer to policing duties, despite inclusion on Brady 
list and strong objection by department); Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Mahnomen, Case 
No. 16-PA-0738 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Aug. 17, 2016) (Paull, Arb.), https://mn.gov/ 
bms/documents/BMS/126428-20160817-Mahnomen.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ8N-B3QJ] (arbitrator 
reinstating officer with last chance agreement despite objection by county, which believed the 
officer was impaired from testifying in the future because of inclusion on Brady list).  
 207. See, e.g., Cent. State Univ. Police Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, 
Inc., FMCS Case No. 08/03136, 125 BNA LA (BL) 981 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Oct. 
28, 2008) (Sellman, Arb.) (overturning suspension for intoxication and conduct unbecoming of  
an officer).  
 208. See, e.g., City of Hous. Police Dep’t v. Sergeant R.T., AAA Case No. 70 390 00205 09, 2009 
BNA LA Supp. (BL) 119556 (Am. Arb. Ass’n May 20, 2009) (Moore, Arb.) (upholding ten-day 
suspension for failure to act and insubordination).  
 209. See, e.g., – Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. City of –, 4661480-AAA, BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
4661480 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Feb. 25, 2019) (Stokes, Arb.) (redacted decision) (upholding three-day 
suspension for uniform violation and visibility of tattoos).  
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scheduling disagreements,210 tardiness,211 and even one case involving 
an officer bringing his new puppy to visit coworkers at the precinct 
without authorization.212 And numerous cases involved officers making 
offensive statements in public or on social media, including one officer 
who, after getting called out for his offensive behavior, bragged online 
that, “I can’t get fired ha ha.”213 That officer was fired by his chief, but 
ultimately rehired by an arbitrator on appeal.214 
A smaller, but still significant, percentage of the cases involved 
domestic violence,215 traffic accidents,216 or substance abuse (most 
notably, alcohol abuse).217 And at least sixteen cases involved officers 
 
 210. See, e.g., Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Borough, 161612-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
161612 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 2, 2010) (Skonier, Arb.) (redacted decision) (overturning ten-day 
suspension related to scheduling disagreement).  
 211. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Tacoma Police Union Loc. 6, FMCS Case No. 17/56138, 138 
BNA LA (BL) 610 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Feb. 26, 2018) (Bonney, Arb.) (overturning 
termination for repeated tardiness among other violations). 
 212. Wright State Univ. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, Inc., FMCS Case No. 
15/01115-6, 135 BNA LA (BL) 1174 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Aug. 3, 2015)  
(Goldberg, Arb.).  
 213. Police Dep’t v. Police Ass’n, 148178-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148178 (Am. Arb. 
Ass’n Sept. 4, 2013) (Visco, Arb.) (redacted decision).  
 214. Id. (reducing the termination to a seven-day suspension from the date of the opinion).  
 215. In total, twenty-seven cases in the dataset involved both domestic disputes and the 
alleged use of physical violence or show of physical force. See, e.g., Minneapolis Police Officers 
Fed’n v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Dec. 30, 2009) (Reynolds, Arb.), 
https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20091230-Mpls.pdf [https://per.ma.cc/WD3E-NGE9] (upholding 
termination in case involving domestic violence and a restraining order); Minneapolis Police 
Officers Fed’n v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. May 18, 2012) (Reynolds, 
Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20120518.pdf [https://perma.cc/32VT-HQZS] (reducing 
termination for case involving felony assault of spouse to a short suspension after the spouse 
recanted claims); Emp. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. –, 149805-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp. 
(BL) 149805 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Oct. 20, 2011) (Talarico, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reinstating officer 
without back pay who was accused of pulling spouse’s hair and hitting her in the head with the 
butt of his gun); Emp. v. Combined L. Enf’t Ass’ns, 148668-AAA, 2012 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148668 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Feb. 17, 2012) (Hays, Arb.) (redacted decision) (upholding termination of officer 
who drunkenly punched spouse multiple times in the face).  
 216. See, e.g., Individual Grievant v. Emp., 148628-AAA, 2012 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148628 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Jan. 21, 2012) (Molina, Arb.) (redacted decision) (upholding one-day suspension 
for car accident while driving at unsafe speed); Emp. v. Union, 149841-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp. 
(BL) 149841 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Nov. 4, 2011) (Miller, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing a three-day 
suspension to a one-day suspension for causing an accident via an illegal turn).  
 217. Many of these cases involved driving while intoxicated. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
U.S. Customs & Border Prot. v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Loc. 3307, FMCS Case No. 13/00842-8, 
133 BNA LA (BL) 419 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Jan. 3, 2014) (Nicholas, Arb.) 
(upholding a reduction in responsibilities after agent caught allegedly driving under the influence 
of alcohol); Police Officers’ Fed’n of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of Mediation 
Servs. Nov. 8, 2014) (Fogelberg, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/20141108-Minneapolis.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3LPA-WBAP] (reducing a thirty-two day suspension to a ten-day suspension in 
case involving officer caught allegedly driving under the influence). Some involve cases where 
alcohol appears to be a contributing factor to other types of misconduct, like public intoxication or 
unbecoming conduct. See, e.g., Cent. State Univ. Police Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. 
Council, Inc., FMCS Case No. 08/03136, 125 BNA LA (BL) 981 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation 
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using racist or homophobic slurs,218 including multiple officers accused 
of using the n-word219 and several who posted offensive or inappropriate 
comments on their social media accounts.220  
The distribution of misconduct listed in Table 1 is significant, in 
part because it provides insight into the wide range of misconduct 
allegedly committed by police officers across the country. On the one 
hand, some of the alleged misconduct handled by the police disciplinary 
system looks fairly similar to the kinds of mistakes or wrongdoing we 
would expect to find in any professional setting. Just like any other 
public servant, some police officers are punished for arriving late to 
work,221 sleeping on the job,222 and failing to properly file paperwork or 
follow day-to-day procedures.223  
On the other hand, these data also demonstrate the unique 
nature of professional misconduct in policing relative to other fields. 
Unlike most other public servants, sworn law enforcement officers 
 
Serv. Oct. 28, 2008) (Sellman, Arb.) (in case where officer allegedly got into a fight while 
intoxicated, overturning suspension because the disciplinary action was not commenced within 
the mandatory time requirements). Other cases involve other types of drugs or unlawful 
substances. See, e.g., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fed. Protective Serv. 
v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., Loc. 505, 130 BNA LA (BL) 481 (May 21, 2012) (Gentile, Arb.) 
(upholding termination for an officer testing positive for methamphetamine); Summit Cnty. Ohio 
Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Ohio Lab. Council, Inc., No. 2013-30, 133 BNA LA (BL) 
546 (May 16, 2014) (Feldman, Arb.) (thirty-day suspension reduced to ten-day suspension in case 
involving marijuana use). 
 218. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Patrolmen’s Union, Local –, 148474-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. 
(BL) 148474 (Am. Arb. Ass’n July 26, 2013) (Litton, Arb.) (redacted decision) (involving an officer 
who made multiple racist comments and social media posts including racial slurs); Police Ass’n v. 
Emp., 205234-AAA, 2016 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 205234 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Nov. 27, 2016) (Lurie, Arb.) 
(redacted decision) (cutting a ten-day suspension in half for an officer who used racist slurs when 
talking to a home inspector, including using the word “wetb[*]ck”).  
 219. See, e.g., City of –, Conn. v. – Police Union, 4664750-AAA, 2019 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
4664750 (Am. Arb. Ass’n May 10, 2019) (Neumeier, Arb.) (redacted decision) (ordering the rehiring 
of an officer who operated a vehicle under the influence, used the n-word multiple times, and 
threatened officers); Emp. (Tex.) v. Tex. Mun. Police Ass’n, 200576-AAA, 136 BNA LA (BL) 1467 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Apr. 22, 2016) (Jennings, Arb.) (redacted decision) (downgrading termination to a 
five-day suspension after officer failed to respond to another officer’s use of “racially insensitive” 
remarks, including use of the n-word and other racist comments).  
 220. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n, 166027-AAA, 2015 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 166027 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Jan. 9, 2015) (Cohen, Arb.) (redacted decision) (upholding three-day suspension 
for officer who made inappropriate comments on social media).  
 221. See, e.g., Emp. v. Individual Grievant, 148334-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148334 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n May 7, 2013) (Barnard, Arb.) (redacted decision) (decreasing a five-day suspension 
to a three-day suspension for arriving late to work and failing to notify supervisor).  
 222. See, e.g., Teamsters, Loc. Union No. 637 v. Licking Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., FMCS No. 050517-
03576-8, 2006 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 117664 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Jan. 10, 2006) 
(Goldberg, Arb.) (upholding termination of officer for sleeping on the job).  
 223. See, e.g., City of W. Carrollton v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Ohio Lab. Council, FMCS No. 
13/01895, 132 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 960 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Oct. 24, 2013) (Lalka, 
Arb.) (upholding termination for repeated failure to submit paperwork as required by performance 
improvement plan).  
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includes fifty-six officers that got their jobs back on appeal despite 
accusations of significant dishonesty,224 including a Minnesota officer 
accused of copying a judge’s signature on a warrant application225 and 
a California officer allegedly caught by his partner planting drug 
evidence on a suspect.226  
Another forty-seven officers accused of unjustified violence were 
ordered rehired, including an officer who shot and killed an unarmed 
man in Oakland, California,227 multiple officers who allegedly pointed 
their guns at fellow officers,228 and multiple officers charged with crimes 
of violence like assault.229 Also among the officers reinstated by 
arbitrators were twenty-two accused of substance abuse,230 nine 
accused of racist or homophobic comments,231 and nine accused of 
sexual impropriety.232 When arbitrators forced communities to rehire 
previously fired officers, the revised punishments varied widely; some 
officers received full back pay and no punishment,233 while other officers 
 
 224. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 150813-AAA, 2009 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 150813 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n June 1, 2009) (Humphries, Arb.) (redacted decision) (overturning termination of 
officer for alleged false statements and ordering officer rehired with back pay).  
 225. Benton Cnty. v. Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., BMS Case No. 18-PA-0058 (Minn. Bureau of 
Mediation Servs. Oct. 12, 2018) (Miller, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/233107-
20181012-Benton.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7PV-TRLZ].  
 226. Cnty. of Stanislaus v. Stanislaus Sworn Deputies Ass’n, Loc. 315, CSMCS Case No. ARB 
09-0478, 128 BN LNA Supp. (BL) 592 (Cal. State Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Oct. 7, 2010) 
(Pool, Arb.). 
 227. City of Oakland v. Oakland Police Officers’ Ass’n, CSMCS Case No. 09-0707, 128 BNA 
LNA Supp. (BL) 1217 (Cal. State Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Mar. 2, 2011) (Gaba, Arb.).  
 228. See, e.g., Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Washington, BMS Case No. 05-PA-599 
(Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs., Apr. 26, 2006) (Befort, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/ 
BMS/155235-Arbitration%20Awards.pdf [https://perma.cc/GKS8-225X] (reducing termination to 
thirty-day suspension); Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Emp., 161709-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
161709 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Feb. 8, 2010) (Skonier, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing termination to 
ten-day suspension).  
 229. See, e.g., Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge – v. Emp., 150395-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
150395 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Jan. 21, 2011) (Long, Arb.) (redacted decision) (grievant charged with 
simple assault, aggravated assault, and harassment); –, Union v. Emp., 4654834-AAA, 2018 BNA 
LA Supp. (BL) 4654834 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Oct. 16, 2018) (Zeiser, Arb.) (redacted decision) (officer 
accused of unjustifiably killing burglary suspect and also faced criminal charges).  
 230. See, e.g., Police Officers Fed’n of Minneapolis v. City of Minneapolis (Minn. Bureau of 
Mediation Servs. Dec. 5, 2007) (Befort, Arb.) (reducing termination involving alcohol use and 
driving under the influence to a five-day suspension).  
 231. See, e.g., Police Ass’n v. Emp., 200981-AAA, 2017 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 200981 (Am. Arb. 
Ass’n June 19, 2017) (Wood, Arb.) (redacted decision) (offenses included racial harassment, 
mocking an accent, racist statements, and slurs; termination reduced to five-day suspension).  
 232. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police, FOP Lodge –, 199114-AAA, 2015 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 199114 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Sept. 28, 2015) (Colflesh, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reinstating officer without back 
pay; officer accused of accessing pornography at work eighty-three times and arranging sexual 
encounters at work).  
 233. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 149508-AAA, 2011 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 149508 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n May 24, 2011) (Humphries, Arb.) (redacted decision) (overturning termination and 
ordering reinstatement with back pay).   
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the discipline was time limited, either because the employer took too 
long to complete its investigation or the complainant made their 
allegation too long after the alleged wrongdoing.236 In other cases, 
arbitrators cited lack of notice,237 improper consideration of prior 
disciplinary history in violation of a collective bargaining agreement or 
state law,238 or other more complicated procedural objections.239 
In a somewhat larger number of cases, arbitrators cited a 
disagreement with the strength of the evidence presented at the 
hearing. Often, these cases involved the arbitrator simply disagreeing 
with the employer’s determination that sufficient evidence existed to 
prove a case by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and 
convincing evidence.240  
But the most common justification for overturning or reducing 
disciplinary action was a determination that the punishment was 
disproportionate. In some cases, arbitrators found that a punishment 
was disproportionate because it failed to properly consider mitigating 
factors in an officer’s record.241 In other cases, arbitrators found that a 
punishment was disproportionate to the punishments given to other 
similarly situated officers in the same department who committed the 
same type of misconduct in the past.242 And in many cases, the 
 
 236. See, e.g., El Paso Police Dep’t v. Police Officer Michael Velez, AAA No. 70 390 00813 04, 
2006 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 117630 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Oct. 18, 2006) (Allen, Jr., Arb.) (justifying 
reduction of six-day penalty to no punishment because notice was not served on the officer within 
the appropriate time limit).  
 237. See, e.g., Police Ass’n v. Emp., 150953-AAA, 2014 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 150593 (Am. Arb. 
Ass’n Jan. 17, 2014) (Simpkins, Arb.) (redacted decision) (“Lack of notice is not an excuse for 
prohibited conduct but it can be, as it is here, a bar to the assessment of discipline and its effect.”).  
 238. See, e.g., Emp. v. Pro. L. Enf’t Ass’n, 4633833-AAA, 2017 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 4633833 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Dec. 4, 2017) (Milinski, Arb.) (redacted decision) (citing improper consideration of 
disciplinary history); Dewitt Charter Twp. v. Police Officers Lab. Council, Grievance POLC No. 
18-001, 139 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 1356, 1362 (Jan. 21, 2019) (McDonald, Arb.) (finding that 
department violated collective bargaining agreement by “not removing a reference to  
the Grievant’s May 2016 discipline from the Grievant’s backdated November 28, 2016  
written reprimand”).  
 239. See, e.g., City of Springfield v. Springfield Police Officers Ass’n, Lodge 22, FMCS Case No. 
150826-57265-8, 2016 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 4660933 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. May 10, 
2016) (Fowler, Arb.) (justifying overturning of punishment because of lack of exact rule on point).  
 240. See, e.g., Police Dep’t v. Individual Grievant, 161551-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
161551 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 23, 2010) (Fragnoli, Arb.) (redacted decision) (determining that, 
despite evidence that an email violating departmental policy originated from an officer’s home IP 
address, this was insufficient on a preponderance of the evidence standard to prove that she  
sent it).  
 241. See, e.g., Law Enf’t Lab. Servs., Inc. v. Steele Cnty., BMS Case No. 06-PA-620 (Minn. 
Bureau of Mediation Servs., Oct. 26, 2006) (Befort, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms-stat/assets/Matejcek-
Steele-County-Decision1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C66W-MRAJ] (focusing primarily on mitigating 
circumstances reducing written reprimand to oral reprimand).  
 242. See, e.g., City of Youngstown v. Youngstown Police Ass’n/The Ohio Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Ass’n, 134 BNA LA (BL) 1644, 1654 (May 20, 2015) (Bell, Arb.) (reducing penalty to 
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arbitrator simply exercised her independent judgment in concluding 
that the penalty given by the police chief or city official was 
disproportionate relative to the offense committed.243 An example from 
Fairfield County, Ohio, illustrates how arbitrators sometimes exercise 
their discretion to reduce officer penalties out of a concern for 
proportionality. In that case, an officer was accused of unnecessarily 
and unjustifiably choking a man in custody.244 The events were 
videotaped, and there did not appear to be any disagreement about the 
facts. The arbitrator ultimately agreed that the officer’s conduct was 
“inappropriate and worthy of discipline,”245 but concluded that “the 
penalty of discharge was too excessive” given the officer’s work history 
and commendations.246  
Similarly, in another Ohio case, an arbitrator largely agreed 
with the factual determinations reached by the police department in 
terminating an officer for “ ‘sexting’ former and current victims of 
crimes that that he had investigated” while on duty, failing to appear 
for a disciplinary interview, and moonlighting as a security guard at a 
liquor store without departmental approval.247 There was little factual 
debate. As the arbitrator noted, the officer “admitted to and accepted 
full responsibility for [his] repeated egregious wrongdoing,” which was 
not “isolated” but rather “continuous for a period of months.”248 As the 
arbitrator bluntly put it, there was a “mountain of misconduct 
demanding harsh discipline.”249 Ultimately, though, the arbitrator 
concluded that some mitigating factors, including the officer’s 
acceptance of responsibility and his marital problems, warranted a 
lesser punishment.250 Thus, despite the arbitrator agreeing that the 
officer’s conduct was “wrongful and reprehensible,” he ordered  
him rehired.251   
In these cases, and dozens of others like them, arbitrators 
arguably substituted the judgment of police chiefs, sheriffs, and city 
 
match that of a prior officer at the department who, in judgment of arbitrator, committed factually 
similar wrongdoing).  
 243. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Ass’n, 200916-AAA, 2017 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 200916 (Am. Arb. 
Ass’n May 18, 2017) (Stein, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing six-day suspension to 
nondisciplinary counseling based on concerns about excessive punishment).  
 244. Fairfield Cnty. Sheriff’s Off. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, FMCS Case No. 07/01667, 124 
BNA LA (BL) 1066 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Nov. 5, 2007) (Chattman, Arb.).  
 245. Id. at 1072.  
 246. Id. at 1073.  
 247. Police Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. Emp., 149974-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 149974 (Am. 
Arb. Ass’n Nov. 7, 2013) (Spring, Arb.) (redacted decision).  
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id.  
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leaders with their own. Critics may argue that this could hamper the 
ability of these more democratically accountable actors to control 
departments and promote organizational reform, as discussed more in 
the next Part.  
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
The findings from this Article have important implications for 
the literature on police accountability and reform. These findings may 
be consistent with claims by police unions that arbitration serves an 
important role in correcting arbitrary and unpredictable punishment 
by management. The results may also be a reminder that not all 
disciplinary appeals necessarily proceed to arbitration. Prior 
examinations have found that management and unions in some cities 
frequently settle disciplinary appeals before they proceed to 
arbitration.252 For example, an examination by William Bender and 
David Gambacorta in the Philadelphia Inquirer found that around 75 
out of 169 police disciplinary cases between 2011 and 2019 in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were settled before they proceeded to 
arbitration.253 This may mean that the cases that actually proceed to 
arbitration in communities like Philadelphia are not a representative 
sample of all disciplinary cases. Instead, the disciplinary cases that 
proceed to arbitration may be the ones where the outcome of the appeal 
is most uncertain—perhaps because of genuine disagreements about 
management’s adherence to organizational precedent for discipline, 
procedural irregularities, or questionable factual findings. Additionally, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that police unions sometimes employ more 
experienced advocates during arbitration procedures, perhaps 
contributing to their high rates of success.254 As one Fraternal Order of 
Police leader joked, lawyers for the police unions are often so much more 
experienced than their government counterparts that “[i]t’s like the 
L.A. Lakers or the 76ers going up against a grade school team. . . . I 
mean, it’s not that hard.”255 This hypothesis—that the frequency of 
reversals of police discipline via arbitration is the result of inadequate 
investment by management in internal investigations—is worthy of 
additional, serious scholarly inquiry. All of this means that we should 
view the data from this study with caution before drawing sweeping 
 
 252. Bender & Gambacorta, supra note 53 (showing in the table, labeled “The Philadelphia 
Police Misconduct Database,” all of the cases between 2011 and 2019 and their outcomes; further 
showing that 75 of the 169 cases listed in this table resulted in a settlement). 
 253. Id.  
 254. Id.  
 255. Id.  
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conclusions about the use of arbitration in police disciplinary cases 
more generally. The high rates of union success may be an outgrowth 
of case selection and other contextual facts unique to the litigation of 
appeals in local governments.  
Nevertheless, the findings from this Article may also be 
consistent with prior criticisms of arbitration in policing. For one thing, 
the evidence from this study is consistent with the hypothesis that the 
use of arbitration on appeal creates incentives for arbitrators to 
consistently reduce disciplinary actions in order to increase their 
probability of being selected in future cases. The high frequency of 
arbitrators overturning or reducing discipline also suggests that 
arbitration may be a barrier to reform efforts. In response, this Part 
concludes by considering ways that communities could amend police 
disciplinary procedures so as to better balance officer due process rights 
with the public’s interest in officer accountability. In doing so, this 
Article draws on recent legislative changes in Minnesota and Oregon as 
possible blueprints for reform in other jurisdictions.  
A. Arbitration and Compromise 
The results of this study are potentially consistent with the 
scholarly hypothesis that arbitration in police disciplinary appeals may 
consistently result in compromise that can impede accountability 
efforts.256 One possible explanation is that the methodology that many 
communities use to select arbitrators may incentivize compromise.257 
Remember, prior research has found that a majority of law enforcement 
agencies use one of two methods to select arbitrators in disciplinary 
appeals—they use either an alternate strike method, where each side 
can strike names in alternating order from a pool of potential 
arbitrators until one name remains, or they name arbitrators in their 
labor agreements.258 Either selection method may incentivize rational 
arbitrators to reach compromise results in the aggregate in order to 
increase their chances of being selected as arbitrators for future cases. 
 
 256. After conducting case studies of the arbitration processes in Chicago and Houston, 
Professor Mark Iris concluded that “arbitration decisions were often based on something other 
than the merits of the parties’ evidence or strength of case presentation.” Iris, supra note 55,  
at 137.  
 257. Rushin, supra note 25, at 566 (“Such a selection process may contribute to arbitrator 
decisions that split the difference between supervisor and union demands, since siding too 
frequently with one side or the other might endanger an arbitrator’s selection in future cases 
through an alternate strike system.”).   
 258. Id. at 574–75 (“Most of these departments fall into two different categories: First, a 
handful of agencies explicitly stipulate an acceptable panel of arbitrators in their union 
contract. . . . Second, another group of agencies establish alternative striking procedures.”).  
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As Professor Iris previously theorized, because of the use of these 
arbitrator selection methods, the decision about “who will serve as an 
arbitrator depends upon the willingness of both parties to a 
dispute . . . to accept that individual as an arbitrator.”259 Arbitrators 
who side with management or the union too often may find themselves 
stricken from the pool of potential arbitrators in future cases, or they 
may find their names taken out of future labor contracts. Because of 
this, Professor Iris concludes, “it is in the self-interest of the individual 
arbitrators to project an image of impartiality.”260 As repeat players who 
are concerned about being selected for future cases, arbitrators may 
often make the rational choice to compromise.261  
In other fields, an arbitrator’s tendency towards compromise 
may not be a problem, particularly when it allows for the resolution of 
matters like financial or contractual disputes between sophisticated 
parties.262 But in the world of police accountability, compromise can 
have serious public policy implications. Compromise can result in unfit 
or dangerous officers terminated for acts of violence or dishonesty being 
forced back onto a police force where they are prone to commit future 
acts of wrongdoing.  
Over the years in San Antonio, Texas, for example, arbitrators 
have repeatedly ordered the rehiring of officers that have allegedly 
committed egregious misconduct, only to have those same officers 
engage in similar misconduct after rehiring. For example, in 2009, a 
San Antonio Police Department (“SAPD”) officer stood accused of 
entering a suspect’s home without a warrant and using excessive force 
 
 259. Iris, supra note 38, at 240.  
 260. Id.  
 261. To be clear, this is just a theory. It is not intended to suggest bad faith on the part of any 
individual arbitrator. For one thing, this kind of incentive may operate unconsciously. And even if 
arbitrators are acting in good faith within the system as currently established, this does not mean 
that the system as a whole serves the public interest. A system of well-intended individuals acting 
in good faith may still produce undesirable results.  
 262. See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not 
Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 452 (2010) (noting that among the 
theories about why sophisticated parties in business relationships may choose arbitration over 
litigation to resolve disputes is that arbitration “may enhance the ability of parties to have their 
disputes resolved using trade rules” and “arbitration may enable the parties to better preserve 
their relationship”); Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap 
“Sophisticated Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 236 (“In arbitration clause analysis, the 
argument is that sophisticated businesspeople, individually or on behalf of a commercial entity, 
can protect themselves from an onerous arbitration clause, while an unsophisticated person 
cannot.”). But cf. Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”: 
Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitrations, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 573, 574 (2001) 
(finding a lack of evidence of compromise in arbitration awards in other contexts).  
          
2021] POLICE ARBITRATION 1067 
in making an arrest.263 Days later, a man arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol accused the officer of challenging him to a fight for 
the opportunity to be released from his custody.264 Based on these 
incidents, the SAPD fired the officer, only to see an arbitrator reduce 
the termination to two thirty-day suspensions and a last chance 
agreement.265 Then, after rejoining the force, the same officer’s squad 
car camera caught him engaging in strikingly similar misconduct when 
he challenged yet another man to a fist fight for the chance to be 
released from his custody.266 Again, the SAPD attempted to fire the 
officer, and again an arbitrator overturned the firing, settling instead 
on a forty-five-day suspension.267   
Similarly, the SAPD fired another officer in 2016 for “trying to 
give a homeless man a sandwich filled with dog feces.”268 But an 
arbitrator ordered that officer rehired on appeal.269 Shortly after 
rehiring, though, the police department again attempted to fire that 
officer, alleging that he committed yet another transgression involving 
excrement.270 This pattern is repeated across the country. When 
 
 263. Tim Gerber, SAPD Officer Appeals Termination, Wins Job Back Through Arbitration, 
KSAT (Apr. 27, 2017, 9:47 PM), https://www.ksat.com/news/2017/04/28/sapd-officer-appeals-
termination-wins-job-back-through-arbitration [https://perma.cc/BK44-75SC].  
 264. Id. 
 265. Id.  
 266. Michael Barajas, San Antonio Cop Arrests, Berates and Threatens to Fight Man for Being 
“Disrespectful,” SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (June 9, 2016, 8:30 AM), https://www.sacurrent.com/the-
daily/archives/2016/06/09/san-antonio-cop-arrests-berates-and-threatens-to-fight-man-for-being-
disrespectful [https://perma.cc/4NBQ-7Z3A]. 
 267. Gerber, supra note 263; see also City of San Antonio v. Officer Matthew Belver, No. 
400169 (Mar. 1, 2017) (Gomez, Arb.), https://www.scribd.com/document/346931719/SAPD-Officer-
Matthew-Belver-arbitration-hearing-document-pdf [https://perma.cc/F5BD-VCU3].  
 268. Sanford Nowlin, Report: Two-Thirds of Fired San Antonio Cops Won Their Jobs Back in 
Arbitration, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (Jan. 7, 2020, 12:45 PM), https://www.sacurrent.com/the-
daily/archives/2020/01/07/report-two-thirds-of-fired-san-antonio-cops-won-their-jobs-back-in-
arbitration [https://perma.cc/45SW-LARE]. 
 269. Sanford Nowlin, San Antonio Officer Who Handed Feces Sandwich to Homeless Man Wins 
His Termination Appeal, SAN ANTONIO CURRENT (Mar. 25, 2019, 3:13 PM), 
https://www.sacurrent.com/the-daily/archives/2019/03/25/san-antonio-officer-who-handed-feces-
sandwich-to-homeless-man-wins-his-termination-appeal [https://perma.cc/7DCX-UDLL]. 
 270. Emilie Eaton, SAPD: Fired Cop Involved in Second Feces Prank, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/SAPD-Fired-cop-involved-in-second-feces-
prank-10886729.php (last updated Jan. 26, 2017, 9:04 PM) [https://perma.cc/TZ6N-9MLX] 
(describing the initial firing decision); Dillon Collier, David Raziq & Joshua Saunders, SAPD 
Officer Who Gave Homeless Man a Feces Sandwich Trying to Win Back Job for a Second Time, 
KSAT, https://www.ksat.com/news/defenders/2020/01/03/sapd-officer-who-gave-homeless-man-a-
feces-sandwich-trying-to-win-back-job-for-a-second-time (last updated Jan. 11, 2020, 8:45 AM) 
[https://perma.cc/DR5F-6ZD4] (detailing the officer’s appeal); Emilie Eaton, Fired SAPD Officer 
Accused in Feces Sandwich Prank Loses Second Bid to Get His Job Back, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS (June 19, 2020), https://www.expressnews.com/news/local/article/Fired-SAPD-officer-
accused-in-feces-sandwich-15353640.php [https://perma.cc/9C9X-X7YH] (explaining that the 
second appeal was unsuccessful and that the officer was finally terminated).  
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compromise on appeal forces police departments to employ dangerous 
or unfit officers, these officers put the public at risk.  
While the evidence from this study is consistent with the 
hypothesis that arbitration incentivizes compromise in police discipline 
cases, it falls short of proving causation. This study cannot answer one 
of the most challenging questions facing critics of police arbitration: 
How often should arbitrators overturn or reduce discipline on appeal? 
As prior research has observed, “[t]here is no easy answer to this 
question” and “appellate success ought to vary by department” based on 
the unique characteristics of each agency and whether a given agency 
is particularly prone to “arbitrary, excessive, or unreasonable 
disciplinary decisions.”271 But what is clear from this study is that the 
frequency of appellate success for police disciplinary appeals greatly 
outpaces the rate of success of litigants in front of other appellate 
bodies. As one recent study found, between July 2017 and June 2018 
across all U.S. federal courts of appeals, only 6.6% of criminal appeals, 
and 7.5% of administrative agency appeals, resulted in reversal.272 In 
total, the annual rate of successful appeals filed in federal courts 
hovered between 6.9% and 9.6% between 2013 and 2018.273 And 
according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the rate of appellate 
success in state criminal courts sat around 12% in 2010.274 These figures 
stand in stark contrast to the 52% rate of success for police disciplinary 
appeals observed in this study. 
 Given the standard of review on appeal in police disciplinary 
cases,275 perhaps it is unsurprising that arbitrators so frequently reduce 
or reverse discipline. Indeed, appellate courts might overturn trial 
courts more often if given more expansive responsibility to review 
factual, legal, and sentencing decisions made by juries and trial courts. 
As it stands, though, appellate courts are almost always given a 
significantly narrower standard of review than arbitrators in police 
disciplinary appeals cases.276 The unpredictable and sometimes 
 
 271. Rushin, supra note 25, at 581.  
 272. Barry C. Edwards, Why Appeals Courts Rarely Reverse Lower Courts: An Experimental 
Study to Explore Affirmation Bias, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1035, 1037 (2019).  
 273. Id. at 1038.  
 274. Id. at 1039 (citing Nicole L. Waters, Anne Gallegos, James Green & Martha Roszi, 
Criminal Appeals in State Courts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS 1 (2015), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/casc.pdf [https://perma.cc/BB9W-KUEU]). 
 275. Rushin, supra note 25, at 576–78.   
 276. Federal appellate courts in the United States may sometimes review “the factual findings 
made by the trial court or agency, but generally may overturn a decision on factual grounds only 
if the findings were ‘clearly erroneous’ ” or if the trial court made a procedural error. Appellate 
Courts and Cases – Journalist’s Guide, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/ 
appellate-courts-and-cases-journalists-guide (last visited Jan. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/39Q4-
CPQT]. Appellate courts in both the criminal and civil justice systems may remedy incorrect 
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arbitrary nature of some departments’ internal disciplinary systems 
may necessitate and justify a higher rate of reversal, relative to the 
American justice system. As explained in the next Section, though, this 
raises even more challenging normative questions about the best way 
to balance democratic accountability and due process rights in police 
disciplinary appeals.  
B. Democratic Accountability and Organizational Change 
The results of this study raise tough questions about democratic 
accountability and the appropriate role of appeals in police disciplinary 
cases. Police unions may understandably argue that appeals to an 
arbitrator are an important due process protection to prevent unjust 
punishment and retaliation. Appellate review may also force 
departments to provide adequate procedural protections during 
internal investigations. And in some cases, it seems that arbitration on 
appeal serves this exact function. For example, in 2017 an arbitrator 
overturned the termination of a police officer in Detroit because the 
employer failed to give the officer a chance to respond to the allegations 
against him before termination, something the arbitrator found 
“antithetical to the whole notion of due process.”277 Such corrections of 
procedural failures by an employer seem to align with the purposes of 
virtually all appellate systems of review.  
But in other cases in the dataset, arbitrators do not merely 
correct procedural due process errors. Instead, the data indicate that 
arbitrators may arguably supplant the judgment of city leaders and 
police chiefs with their own judgments on matters of facts and 
proportionality. Consider, for example, a case from Texas involving an 
officer appealing his termination for use of threats, profanity, and a 
homophobic slur during an arrest.278 In that case, a bystander video 
recorded the officer on top of a handcuffed man yelling, “Move and die. 
Move and f[*]cking die. F[*]cking move again. F[*]cking move again.”279 
 
applications of law but ordinarily do not replace the judgment of lower courts or juries on matters 
of fact or the appropriate punishment, so long as the punishment is within the range specified by 
statutes or sentencing guidelines. Id. 
 277. Detroit Transp. Serv. v. Police Officers Lab. Council, FMCS Case No. 1754575, 138 BNA 
LA (BL) 209, at *215 (Fed. Mediation & Conciliation Serv. Dec. 22, 2017) (Obee, Arb.).  
 278. Officer A__ v. Emp., 148464-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148464 (Am. Arb. Ass’n July 
24, 2013) (Fragnoli, Arb.) (redacted decision) (noting also that the stop started after the officer saw 
the man allegedly make a “gesture indicating he might have been hiding something in his 
waistband,” leading the officer to execute a stop; thereafter when the officer learned that the man 
had several active warrants, he decided to execute an arrest).  
 279. When one of the suspect’s friends asked, “Are you f[*]cking serious?” the officer 
responded, “Sit down. Sit down and shut the f[*]ck up.” As the exchange continued, both the 
suspect and the officer referred to one another by a homophobic slur, and the officer told the 
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The video also caught the officer referring to the handcuffed man by a 
homophobic slur and challenging him to “move” or “blink wrong,” 
seemingly in hopes of providing the officer with a justification to use 
additional force.280 While the arbitrator in that case conceded that 
“[t]here is no question that the Grievant’s conduct violated Department 
policy,”281 he ultimately concluded that termination was 
“disproportionate to the severity of the proven charges and 
unwarranted in light of mitigating factors,” including the officer’s prior 
service record and the fact that “this is a case about language  
only.”282 That arbitrator ultimately reduced the officer’s sentence to a 
fifteen-day suspension.283  
As another example, take the case involving an Ohio officer who 
allegedly forced his way into the home of his ex-girlfriend, punched 
holes in her wall, and ultimately faced criminal charges for assaulting 
her multiple times.284 The arbitrator in that case agreed that the 
officer’s behavior constituted “conduct unbecoming [of] a police officer,” 
which “warrants serious discipline.”285 But the arbitrator concluded 
that termination was too harsh; he instead issued a ten-day suspension, 
which he felt would be enough to “serve as a warning . . . to other 
officers that such actions cannot be tolerated.”286  
Indeed, arbitrators in this dataset reduced or overturned 
punishments as unduly severe or disproportionate in cases of officers 
that engaged in domestic violence,287 utilized excessive force,288 cheated 
on exams,289 and exposed their genitals in public.290 In many of these 
 
suspect, “Move so I can kick your ass. Move so I can f[*]ck you up. Give me a reason to f[*]ck you 
up. Stupid ass. When the police are talking to you, you be quiet and shut up.” Id.  
 280. Id.   
 281. Id.  
 282. Id.  
 283. Id.  
 284. Emp. v. Union, 162289-AAA, 2014 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 162289 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Apr. 10, 
2014) (Bethel, Arb.).  
 285. Id.  
 286. Id.  
 287. See, e.g., Emp. v. Command Officers Ass’n, 148269-AAA, 2013 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 148269 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 25, 2013) (Wolkinson, Arb.) (redacted decision) (reducing termination to 
suspension without back pay in case involving domestic violence, harassing and threatening a 
private citizen, dishonesty, and violation of a last chance agreement in failing to see a therapist).  
 288. See, e.g., Individual Grievant v. Emp., 200818-AAA, 2017 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 200818 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 9, 2017) (Toedt, Arb.) (redacted decision) (finding punishment too severe in 
case where officer allegedly grabbed man by the throat during traffic stop without justification).   
 289. See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Ohio State Troopers Ass’n, 2009 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 118488 
(May 11, 2009) (Feldman, Arb.) (citing “impeccable” record of officer to justify overturning 
termination for cheating on exam).  
 290. See, e.g., Emp. v. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 161994-AAA, 2010 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 161994 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n July 14, 2010) (Humphries, Arb.) (redacted decision) (overturning termination in 
case involving officer urinating on duty in public and exposing his genitals).   
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cases, the facts were mostly or completely undisputed. Often, there was 
no debate about the procedural sufficiency of due process rights 
afforded to the officer. And yet despite the fact that some of these 
instances of officer misconduct might, as one arbitrator conceded, 
“ ‘shock the conscience’ of most citizens,”291 arbitrators in the dataset 
exercised their authority to lower the punishment out of a concern  
for proportionality.  
All this suggests that, as currently structured, the existing 
process of police disciplinary appeals is not just an appellate system. 
Instead, critics of this system may argue that it creates a shadow 
disciplinary system that can largely disregard the decisions reached by 
law enforcement agencies, city leaders, or civilian review boards.292 
Scholars have expressed widely varying views about how to create an 
internal disciplinary process for law enforcement officers that is 
sufficiently responsive to democratic demands without risking officer 
due process.293 Some scholars prefer to vest primary disciplinary 
authority in the hands of police chiefs.294 Others believe that police 
chiefs are too insulated from democratic accountability and argue 
instead that communities should vest authority in groups like civilian 
review boards that are more directly accountable and representative of 
the public.295 But regardless of where scholars fall on this spectrum, 
there seems to be broader agreement that “officer oversight should not 
be divorced from community input.”296  
The current approach to police discipline, though, creates a 
procedural redundancy that may curtail the ability of many police 
chiefs and community leaders to control their police departments. This 
 
 291. City of St. Paul v. St. Paul Police Fed’n 24 (Minn. Bureau of Mediation Servs. Apr. 3, 
2017) (Miller, Arb.), https://mn.gov/bms/documents/BMS/129594-20170403-St.Paul.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/N3SG-FBJ8]. In that case, the St. Paul Police Department terminated an officer in 2016 
for engaging in excessive force and unnecessarily deploying a canine on an unarmed man, resulting 
in multiple broken ribs, two collapsed lungs, and other injuries. The facts in the case were clear, 
as the incident was caught on camera. As the arbitrator conceded in the opinion: 
At first blush, the video of K-9 Falco grabbing and biting Mr. Baker, twisting Mr. Baker 
around in a circle and then having the Grievant administer two consecutive kicks to 
Mr. Baker’s torso and then waiting about 30 more seconds to administer another kick 
to Mr. Baker’s torso would be proof alone to terminate. 
Id. But the arbitrator ultimately elected to reduce the penalty to a thirty-day suspension based 
largely on proportionality concerns.  
 292. Rushin, supra note 25, at 582–83 (using the example of Detroit to describe how cities that 
have robust civilian review boards may nevertheless blunt their effectiveness with the use of 
binding arbitration on appeal).  
 293. See generally Christopher E. Stone & Heather Ward, Democratic Policing: A Framework 
for Action, 10 POLICING & SOC’Y 11, 12 (2000) (considering this question). 
 294. Id. at 17.  
 295. Id. at 17–18.  
 296. Rushin, supra note 25, at 589.  
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could be problematic for many reasons. While unions may argue that 
arbitrators are more detached or neutral, they may be disconnected 
from the communities that the police department serves. And they may 
lack the same institutional memory as police supervisors and may be 
less responsive to community demands for increased accountability for 
wrongdoing. They do not have to internalize or experience the costs they 
place on communities by overturning discipline, for example in cases 
where they force a department to rehire an officer who cannot testify at 
trial because they are on a Brady list297 or an officer with a proven 
proclivity for violence. And they may be disconnected from the 
budgetary challenges they force on municipalities when they order 
rehired an officer who cannot be safely deployed on the streets and must 
therefore be hidden somewhere else in the organization.  
Additionally, to the extent that communities demand reform 
within a law enforcement agency, the current approach to police 
disciplinary appeals used in many agencies could make transformative 
change more difficult. Prior studies have shown that a small number of 
officers are often responsible for a disproportionate amount of 
misconduct.298 Further, recent empirical work suggests that the 
presence of a small number of officers engaged in repeated misconduct 
may increase the probability of misconduct among other officers around 
them.299 This indicates that in order to reform a police department, 
supervisors must be able to remove bad officers before their wrongdoing 
can escalate and cause serious harm.300 But one of the possible effects 
of the current police disciplinary appeals process is that, in some cases, 
it lengthens considerably the time it takes to remove these unfit officers 
from the force. Often, arbitrators demand that departments build 
lengthy records of officer wrongdoing before they will uphold a 
termination. And even when departments do build such a record, some 
 
 297. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (explaining the basis of Brady lists and some 
of the recent literature on the topic).  
 298. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUST. & BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., USE OF FORCE BY POLICE: 
OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., at viii (1999), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/176330-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMT7-X6SH] (“A small portion 
of officers are disproportionately involved in use-of-force incidents.”).  
 299. George Wood, Daria Roithmayr & Andrew V. Papachristos, The Network Structure of 
Police Misconduct, 5 SOCIUS 1 (2019) (finding through a network analysis of 16,503 complaints 
involving 15,811 police officers over a six-year period in Chicago that “almost half of police officers 
are connected in misconduct ties in broader networks of misconduct”).   
300.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting that at least one compelling new paper has cast serious 
doubt on whether incapacitating a few bad officers can substantially reduce misconduct. See Aaron 
Chalfin & Jacob Kaplan, How Many Complaints Against Police Officers Can Be Abated by 
Incapacitating a Few ‘Bad Apples?’ (Oct. 29, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3673981 [https://perma.cc/NEM6-84VL].  
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police chiefs complain that arbitrators may still decide that a long-
documented history is insufficient to justify termination.   
For instance, a police department documented an extensive 
record of prior misconduct by a single officer, including “fourteen (14) 
written counseling’s, twenty-two (22) reprimands, and eight (8) 
suspensions; the most recent being thirty (30) days.”301 In August 2007, 
that officer detained a man for nine hours after being ordered to release 
him from his custody.302 The chief concluded that the officer’s 
“irresponsible behavior . . . placed the health and life of the prisoner in 
jeopardy.”303 Based on this conclusion and the officer’s extensive 
disciplinary history, the mayor terminated his employment.304 But on 
appeal, an arbitrator ordered the officer rehired.305 While the arbitrator 
agreed that the officer’s behavior “amounted to gross misjudgment and 
negligence,” he described termination as “the capital punishment of 
employment discipline.”306 Ultimately, he felt such a severe punishment 
was inappropriate, largely because he could not find evidence that the 
city had similarly punished other officers accused of oversight of 
procedures involving inmates in custody.307   
This is just one of many similar cases in the dataset. To be clear, 
arbitrators likely serve a valuable role in creating incentives for 
departments to properly document misconduct by employees over time 
and employ a progressive disciplinary system. But to the extent that 
the current approach to police disciplinary appeals makes it 
unreasonably difficult to remove unfit officers from the force in a timely 
manner, the existing system may also impede reform. 
C. Alternative Appellate Procedures 
Police officers deserve adequate procedural protections against 
arbitrary punishment and retaliation. Nevertheless, these protections 
should not become so cumbersome as to unreasonably impair the ability 
 
 301. City of Florida City v. Dade Cnty. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., 2008 BNA LA Supp. (BL) 
118889 (Sept. 9, 2008) (Smith, Arb.).  
 302. Id. The officer was instructed and agreed to release the man before the end of his shift. 
But he said that he assumed that the man was released by someone else. The officer also failed to 
physically walk into the holding cells or check on the inmate, as was apparently protocol.  
 303. Id.  
 304. Id. (explaining how the termination was approved by supervisors and then ordered by  
the mayor).   
 305. Id. (“R shall be reinstated forthwith, to the same or equivalent position that he held prior 
to his employment termination.”).  
 306. Id.  
 307. Id. (“There was abundant evidence presented by the Union to show that the City was lax 
in enforcing the rules requiring arresting officers to check on their prisoners at 30-minute 
intervals, and to enter those times in the prisoner log book.”).  
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of police supervisors to control their departments or promote reform. 
The empirical findings from this Article raise questions about whether 
the current approach to police disciplinary appeals in the United States 
strikes a fair balance between these competing values. There are 
several ways that communities could restructure their police 
disciplinary appeals procedures.  
First, and perhaps most radically, communities could transfer 
disciplinary appeals authority to parties other than arbitrators. 
Instead, communities could have more democratically accountable 
actors like city managers, mayors, or city councils hear disciplinary 
appeals. A number of communities across the country already do this.308 
For example, in Murrieta, California, officers have the ability to appeal 
discipline issued by the police chief to the city manager.309 This still 
provides officers with an opportunity to appeal disciplinary decisions to 
a party outside the police department—but one that more intimately 
understands the demands of the community and the impact of any 
disciplinary decision and termination on the police department. An 
examination by the Boston Globe found that Murrieta has not had to 
rehire any officer it previously fired while using this appellate model, 
something that is not true for many similarly sized departments 
utilizing arbitration.310  
Of course, police unions may understandably argue that a city 
manager is insufficiently detached from the police department to act as 
a neutral outsider. In this way, arbitration may have an advantage. If 
cities want to maintain the use of arbitration, there are ways to do so 
while still providing a more substantial role for community oversight of 
the appeals process. A number of cities, including Buena Park, 
 
 308. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Fountain Valley and the 
Fountain Valley Police Officers’ Association 36–37 (2020), https://www.fountainvalley.org/ 
DocumentCenter/View/12231/Police-Officers-Association-2020-2021 [https://perma.cc/4HFW-
C5NZ] (vesting appellate authority in the city manager rather than in arbitrators, and in some 
cases allowing challenges of the city manager’s decision to be brought to city council).   
 309. See Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Murrieta and the Murrieta 
Police Officers Association 5–10 (2019), https://www.murrietaca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/285/ 
Murrieta-Police-Officers-Association-MPOA-2019-to-2021-PDF [https://perma.cc/E5MG-3UL2] 
(discussing disciplinary and appeals procedures).  
 310. Editorial Board, Editorial, Other Cities Can Fire Police Officers for Misconduct. Why Not 
Boston?, BOS. GLOBE, https://www.bostonglobe.com/2020/07/02/opinion/other-cities-can-fire-
police-officers-misconduct-why-not-boston/ (last updated July 2, 2020, 4:00 AM) 
[https://perma.cc/KES6-UYVH] (“A police department spokesman told the Globe that the city 
[Murrieta] has never been forced to rehire a cop who had been previously fired.”).   
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California,311 Cathedral City, California,312 Oxnard, California,313 and 
Peoria, Arizona,314 use arbitration for disciplinary appeals, but make 
the decision of the arbitrator advisory rather than binding. This model 
may allow officers to make their case before a neutral outsider, perhaps 
in a more procedurally robust manner than anything that may be 
available through a department’s internal process. The weight of an 
arbitration opinion in an officer’s favor may be sufficient to convince the 
city to abide by that decision. But at the same time, this method 
recognizes the need for democratic accountability and control over  
local police forces by allowing city leaders “to depart from decisions 
made by an arbitrator when [they] appear[ ] to run counter to the  
public’s interest.”315  
Second, if communities want to maintain the use of arbitration 
as an important due process protection for officers, they may consider 
altering the method of selecting arbitrators to reduce the incentive to 
compromise. Minnesota recently enacted such a reform. In the wake of 
the killing of George Floyd, legislators in Minnesota passed a wide-
ranging reform bill entitled the Police Accountability Act of 2020.316 
While this bill touched on numerous policing issues,317 it also reformed 
the process of selecting arbitrators in police disciplinary appeals.318 
Under the new law, the government appoints a roster of six arbitrators 
to hear police disciplinary appeals for the state. To be eligible for 
 
 311. Memorandum of Understanding Between the City of Buena Park, California and the 
Buena Park Police Association 40–42, 62–64 (2019), http://www.buenapark.com/home/ 
showdocument?id=16689 [https://perma.cc/R8FD-5K39] (stating that the arbitrator’s opinion is 
advisory in nature).   
 312. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Cathedral City and Cathedral City 
Police Officer’s Association (CCPOA) 21–23 (2020), http://www.joincathedralcity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/10/CCPOA-MOU-Final-05.07.20-1-Rev.-06.10.20-Side-Letter-10.01.20.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y9R7-SMTQ] (“City Manager or designee mutually agreeable to the City 
Manager and the employee shall review the Hearing Officer’s recommendation, but shall not be 
bound thereby.”).  
 313. See Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Oxnard and Oxnard Peace Officers’ 
Association 22–23 (2016), https://www.oxnard.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/OPOA-MOU.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2TAU-78HA] (also making arbitration decisions advisory).  
 314. Memorandum of Understanding Between City of Peoria and Peoria Police Officers 
Association, Covering Police Officers Unit 23–24 (2018), https://www.peoriaaz.gov/home/ 
showpublisheddocument?id=17212 [https://perma.cc/6PGA-2AL8] (allowing police department to 
appeal arbitration decision to city manager).  
 315. Rushin, supra note 25, at 591.  
 316. See Orenstein & Callaghan, supra note 67 (discussing the law).  
 317. League Calls on Legislature to Keep Working on Police Arbitration Reform, LEAGUE OF 
MINN. CITIES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.lmc.org/news-publications/news/all/police-arbitration-
reform [https://perma.cc/EZ4N-7MTH] (noting that the new police reform bill in Minnesota was 
wide-ranging, including limitations on the use of chokeholds, the establishment of an independent 
use of force investigation unit at the state level, and reporting requirements for officer use of force).  
 318. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.892 (West 2020) (providing a description of this  
selection method).  
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selection on the state’s appointed roster, a potential arbitrator must 
“complete training . . . [on] cultural competency, racism, implicit bias, 
and recognizing and valuing community diversity and cultural 
differences.”319 Now, anytime a police disciplinary appeal proceeds to 
arbitration, there is no longer an alternate strike system to select an 
arbitrator. Instead, the state simply assigns one of these six arbitrators 
on a rotating basis.320 The hope is that by eliminating the traditional 
selection process, arbitrators will not have the same incentives to 
compromise in order to increase their probability of being selected in 
future cases.321 Time will tell whether this change in selection method 
will influence arbitration outcomes. But at a minimum, the Minnesota 
reform removes the appearance of either management or unions 
attempting to game the arbitrator selection process to their advantage.  
Third, as an alternative to altering the selection process, 
communities that want to maintain the use of arbitration could limit 
the standard of review on appeal or the remedies available to an 
arbitrator. Currently, most arbitrators are given fairly expansive 
authority to rehear most or all factual and legal disputes in disciplinary 
cases on appeal, something that rarely occurs in other appellate 
contexts.322 But it does not have to be this way. Some communities 
already give arbitrators narrower standards of review.323 Rather than 
granting arbitrators the ability to determine whether “just cause” 
existed for the discipline, communities could instead limit the 
arbitrators’ review authority to a determination of whether the 
punishment was, say, arbitrary or capricious. Or they could limit the 
ability of arbitrators to amend the disciplinary punishment, provided 
that the employer has satisfied the preponderance of the evidence 
standard in proving a violation of departmental policy.  
Consider the example of Oregon.324 Under the recently passed 
law in that state, police departments must now negotiate with police 
 
 319. Id. § 628.892(10)(a)(1). 
 320. Id. § 628.892(11) (“The commissioner shall assign or appoint an arbitrator or panel of 
arbitrators from the roster to a peace officer grievance arbitration under this section on rotation 
through the roster alphabetically ordered by last name.”).  
 321. Collins, supra note 136.  
 322. Rushin, supra note 25, at 576–78.  
 323. See, e.g., Agreement Between City of Bloomington, Illinois and Police Benevolent and 
Protective Association, Unit No. 21, at 15 (2014), https://www.cityblm.org/Home/ 
ShowDocument?id=504 [https://perma.cc/R84T-G83V] (establishing a standard of review that says 
arbitrator must uphold punishment unless “arbitrary, unreasonable or unrelated to the needs of 
the service”). 
 324. For a brief history of the debate surrounding this law, see Nigel Jaquiss, Skeptics Say 
Oregon’s Police Arbitration Bill Doesn’t Do Enough, While Cops Play Defense, WILLAMETTE  
WEEK (June 25, 2020), https://www.wweek.com/news/2020/06/25/skeptics-say-oregons-police-
arbitration-bill-doesnt-do-enough-while-cops-play-defense [https://perma.cc/8TJA-3S89]; see also 
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unions over the terms of a disciplinary matrix that will set levels of 
discipline for different types of officer misconduct.325 Once the two 
parties have reached an agreement on the terms of their agreed upon 
disciplinary matrix, state law limits the ability of arbitrators to deviate 
from a police chief’s disciplinary decision on appeal, as long as it abides 
by the disciplinary matrix.326 Essentially, if an arbitrator agrees that 
evidence existed to justify the punishment in question and the 
punishment is within the limits of the disciplinary matrix, the 
arbitrator may not reduce the officer’s discipline below that issued by 
the city management or police chief. The Oregon approach effectively 
narrows the arbitrator’s standard of review and remedial toolkit—
potentially meeting some of the demands of reform activists and 
management. At the same time, it also puts the impetus on cities to 
proactively negotiate the terms of the disciplinary matrix in a manner 
that satisfies union demands for predictability in punishment and fair 
notice. Like with the Minnesota reform, time will tell whether the 
Oregon approach will influence disciplinary appeal outcomes. But the 
Oregon law may prove to be the most politically palatable reform option 
for some states in the future, as it has the potential to garner limited 
support from police reformers, management, and unions.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article finds that police arbitration results in nearly half of 
all police disciplinary penalties being reduced or overturned on appeal, 
often because of arbitrators’ reevaluation of the factual support for 
disciplinary charges or because of their belief that the proposed 
punishment is excessive. This finding raises broader normative 
questions about how communities ought to structure the police 
disciplinary appeals process. Police disciplinary appeals are 
challenging, in part because the stakes in many of these cases are 
extraordinarily high. On the one hand, unjust discipline can unfairly 
derail an officer’s livelihood. On the other hand, failure to respond 
 
Dirk VanderHart & Jeff Mapes, Oregon Legislature Advances Police Accountability Measures, OR. 
PUB. BROAD. (June 26, 2020), https://www.opb.org/news/article/oregon-senate-sends-police-
discipline-bill-to-house [https://perma.cc/THK9-BE7C] (describing the advancement of the bill and 
its development over time).  
 325. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.650(7)(g) (West 2020) (detailing the matrices requirement for 
collective bargaining purposes).  
 326. Id. § 243.706(3) (explaining that if an “arbitrator makes a finding that misconduct has 
occurred consistent with the law enforcement agency’s finding of misconduct,” then “the 
arbitration award may not order any disciplinary action that differs from . . . the provisions of a 
discipline guide or discipline matrix adopted by the agency”). 
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forcefully to evidence of misconduct can put members of the public at 
risk for the deadly consequences of police wrongdoing.  
Take the example of an officer from the Oakland Police 
Department.327 On New Year’s Eve of 2007, that officer shot and killed 
an unarmed twenty-year-old man who ran and hid from the officer.328 
Only seven months later, that officer shot another unarmed twenty-
year-old three times in the back, killing him.329 The officer’s actions cost 
the city $650,000 in a civil judgment.330 Based on these events, the City 
of Oakland terminated his employment.331 But as in many of the cases 
discussed in this Article, an arbitrator overturned this decision and 
ordered the officer rehired with full back pay.332 The arbitrator 
disagreed with the city’s conclusion that the officer’s use of force was 
unjustified and argued that “sacrificing [the officer] on the altar of 
public opinion” would not bring back the victim.333  
All officers, including that officer in Oakland, deserve adequate 
due process before they suffer serious discipline. And no officer’s career 
should be unfairly ended for political expedience. Even so, the Oakland 
Police Department also has a pressing need to rigorously enforce its 
bars on officer use of excessive force. The current approach to police 
disciplinary appeals in the United States may not be striking an 
appropriate balance between these important, competing values. By 
narrowing the standard of review on appeal, limiting the available 
remedies, or modifying the process of selecting arbitrators, 
communities may be able to better strike a balance between officer due 




 327. Sean Maher, Oakland Police Officer to be Reinstated, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 6, 2011,  
11:11 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2011/03/06/oakland-police-officer-to-be-reinstated 
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 328. Id. (“[H]e and another officer shot and killed 20-year-old Andrew Moppin after a traffic 
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 330. Friedersdorf, supra note 32.  
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the 2007 shooting that was deemed consistent with policy).  
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